Watching how the Eagles' defense swallowed up the Vikings' offense in the 2nd half of Sunday's Wild Card Playoff game was terribly frustrating.  Brad Childress used to work for the Eagles.  He, above anyone, should know that the Eagles blitz more than any team in the NFL.  The Vikings, with two great running backs and a good running quarterback, had the potential to combat this.  Yet, the Vikings failed to take any of the obvious measures.  They didn't run any draws, they didn't throw any screen passes, and they shackled their running quarterback.

Watching the Vikings pretend that Tarvaris Jackson was Dan Fouts was sickening.  For four pivotal minutes of the 4th Quarter (from the 7:30 to 3:30 mark, in between which the Eagles extended their lead to 23-14), the Vikings called eight straight drop-back passes -- all eight of which were incomplete!  What on earth were they thinking?  The Eagles just reared back with abandon and came after Jackson, who was a sitting duck in the pocket.  Worst of all, on several of those plays, the Vikings emptied the backfield, thereby inviting the blitz without any fear of a draw or screen, let alone providing Jackson with a blocking back.

Brad Childress and his inept offensive coordinator, Darrell Bevell, deserve to be fired for gross ineptitude.  Bevell cheated his defensive counterpart, Leslie Frazier, by developing an incredibly inferior game plan to the one Frazier used to hold the Eagles to 9 offensive points through three quarters.  They cheated Jared Allen, who was playing his heart out, and the other members of the Viking front seven, who sacked McNabb three times and held Brian Westbrook to 38 yards on 20 carries.  And they cheated all NFL fans who wasted time watching them abandon their strengths.

Rumor has it that Childress and his staff expressly instructed Tarvaris Jackson NOT to run!  And until there were only three minutes left in the game, Tarvaris listened to them.  Then he ripped off an easy 17-yard run and later had a 13-yard run negated by a penalty.  Where was this asset in the first 95% of the game?

Adrian Peterson can bust a long-gainer or TD on any given play.  How could you take him (and even the threat of him) out of your game plan?  Chester Taylor was having a strong outing.  Play that card.  Run some draws!  Throw some screens.  In the cruelest irony of all, the game's decisive play was a 71-yard TD on a screen pass -- thrown by McNabb to Westbrook.  Yes, the Eagles sent the Vikings off to an early winter of ice-fishing on the very play that Minnesota should have been calling against Philadelphia.

Another theme for which the Viking coaching staff deserves serious criticism is its inability to improve its punt coverage or, at least, to adjust its game plan in light of this seemingly uncorrectable flaw.  Given that Minnesota came into the game with the worst punt coverage in the NFL (14.9 yards per return and 4 TDs) and promptly allowed a 62-yard return on its first punt, why didn't Childress go into four-down mode whenever his team crossed midfield?  Twice Minnesota was around the Eagles 40 yard-line and threw incomplete passes on 3rd-down and punted on 4th.  Why not muscle-up and run on 3rd and maybe even 4th?  Why not have a designed QB draw?  To give up the ball and punt for only 20 or 25 yards (in one case it was a net of 17) is moronic. 

In years past, Jack Del Rio has often cheated his physical team of chances to punch its opponents in the mouth and Brad Childress must be trying to emulate him.  Childress has no excuses for not knowing how often the Eagles blitz and for not knowing that the best way to beat the Eagles is to relentlessly pound on them.  To play this game passively, without maximizing the running of Tarvaris Jackson, Adrian Peterson, and Chester Taylor, was criminal and warrants dismissal.

P.S.  I must note that the Vikings might still have persevered had the officials called an obvious pass interference against the Eagles on the first play of the 4th Quarter.  Minnesota was facing 3rd and 5 from the Eagles' 49-yard line and threw deep down the right sideline to Bernard Berrian, who had easily blown past the Eagles corner and was wide open, waiting for the ball to come down.  Seeing it veer a bit, he tried to adjust towards the middle of the field, but the Eagles' safety (whose back was to the ball) grabbed him and prevented him from getting there.  The call was obvious.  With the long ball in flight, no one could have been looking anywhere else.  No official could have missed this.  While the officials allowed the Eagles to get away with at least two other defensive pass interferences in the game, this one would have given the Vikings the ball around the 10-yard line in a 16-14 game.  Naturally, neither the network nor ESPN made any mention of this sham when it was piling the accolades onto Donovan McNabb.  With the "Face of the NFL" (Peyton Manning) having been eliminated the night before and the Patriots, Cowboys, and Brett Favre already missing from the playoffs, the NFL needs all the star power it can get or it'll be looking at a ratings disaster like the Rays/Phillies world series.  Was it any surprise the zebras would help McNabb's team?

The league is CHEATING like crazy for poster-boy Peyton Manning.  In one drive alone, he benefitted from two bogus defensive pass interferences and a premature whistle that prevented a fumble by his receiver, Anthony Gonzalez.  The Colts finished this gift-wrapped drive with their first FG of the 4th Qtr. 

Throw in that they scored one TD on 4th-down and had to convert another 4th-down to get to the game-winning 51-yard FG.  The Colts continue to squeek by and the Chargers lose for the 4th time in the final 24 seconds of a game!  Oh, and let's not forget the pick play to get the first TD. 

Coaching:  Would you have attempted the 47-yard FG to tie and left all that time on the clock or gone on 4th-and-2 in search of a TD or at least a chipshot FG?  That 47-yarder had less likelihood of success than a play-action pass and far less upside.   (Remember that Nate Kaeding had made only one of his last five FG attempts from beyond the 40-yard line and is just under 75% lifetime between 40-49 yards.  Anyone who believes a 47-yarder is a chip shot FG, only needs to ask Buffalo about last Monday night or Scott Norwood's legendary Super Bowl miss.)

Quarterbacking:  what on earth was that Rivers buffoon doing on the first drive of the 2nd-half?  His running backs put him in easy FG range and set the tone for the 2nd-half.  Instead, he gets stripped of the football by Robert Mathis when rolling to his LEFT (despite being right-handed).  Eat the f'ng ball, you moron, and settle for the FG!

Somewhere Marty Schottenheimer is pulling his hair out!  Norv Turner is a bona fide, serial loser.  At least Marty always got to the playoffs.  The idea that the Chargers could miss the playoffs despite playing in the 2nd-worst division in the NFL is an astounding indictment of the coaching staff.

Yes, Charlie Manuel, the manager who looks and talks like a bumbling fool just whupped another media favorite -- AL Manager of the Year, Joe Maddon.  Charlie may not impress many sportswriters, much less fans outside of Philadelphia (heck, TSN didn't even name him the NL Manager of the Year), but the guy doesn't make mistakes and, according to Peter Gammons, knows hitting like nobody out there.  Maddon, on the other hand, talks smoothly and looks erudite with his clunky eyeglasses and Lafayette College degree, but manages a game so poorly you have to wonder about his mental well-being.

In the end, Charlie's Phillies won all three 1-run games to enable a quick 5-game upset of Maddon's Rays in the 2008 World Series.  Strike that, Charlie whupped Maddon in all three 1-run games to steal the world series title.  Any manager worth his salt would have put up a better fight and probably forced extra innings in at least two of these games.

Thinking back to my last post, I hardly find it coincidental that the Rays' offense never got back in gear after Maddon pulled up on the throttle in the 5th game of the ALCS.  The stats are irrefutable, though the cause might be debated:  In TB's first 76.1 innings of hitting, the Rays scored 59 runs, for a rate of 6.96 runs per 9 innings.  For the last 64 innings (those transpiring after Maddon took game 5 of the ALCS for granted and stopped managing), the Rays "offense" scored a paltry 20 runs, for a rate of just 2.81 runs per 9 innings.

From that point forward, as I cited that very night, Joe Maddon has continually excelled at impersonating Joe Torre by "grounding his running game to enable the opposition to turn double plays and mismanaging his bullpen."  After providing some background, let's explore these two points in the context of tonight's resumed WS game 5.

For the 2008 playoffs, the Rays basestealers were successful 24 times in 27 attempts.  While those stats are impressive on their own, they don't begin to tell the full story.  After deducting the eight attempts made by Tampa's modest runners (Carlos Pena, Gabe Gross, and Dioner Navarro, who was caught on a failed hit 'n run), the Rays faster runners went a perfect 19-for-19!  Yes, that's 19-0.  Let me state that another way: 

No TB Ray who had 5 steals or more during the regular season was EVER thrown out during the playoffs!  Crawford (7-0), Upton (6-0), Bartlett (2-0), Iwamura (2-0), Longoria (1-0), and Fernando Perez (1-0) were never caught.  Not once.

Given that 100% success rate, wouldn't you send each one of these guys every single time?  When facing pitchers like Cole Hamels (only 2 of 17 basestealers thrown out) and Brett Myers (only 3 of 20 thrown out) how could one ever resist?  Oh, but resist they did.  And it started in the very 1st inning of the first game when Iwamura didn't attempt a steal of second and BJ Upton grounded into a double-play.

There, I said it.  I opened the door to my biggest criticism of Joe Maddon:  he continually violated one of my strongest rules in all of sports:

Never hit into more double-plays with speedy runners on base than you get caught stealing!

This is a rule as hard 'n fast as my football mandate that no quarterback should ever get intercepted (excluding hail maries and balls tipped first by his own receiver) more often than he gets sacked.  Whenever a competent and accurate QB does this it indicates he has happy feet and is rushing to throw the football before fully reading the defense.

Until someone, anyone, had shown Joe Maddon that he could gun down Tampa's speedy runners, why not send them all?  Permanent green light.  Forget the Republicans chant of "Drill, baby, Drill," and go with Lori Petty's slogan for the National Thoroughbred Racing Association of "Go, baby, Go!"  Or, as I screamed during the 9th inning of ALCS game 5 when TB had Bartlett and Upton on base, "Go, dang it, go!" 

Maddon, of course, didn't send them and Pena promptly grounded into an inning-ending double play.  Just as Longoria had done in the 7th inning when Maddon didn't send Upton and Pena.  TB stopped running in Game 5 of the ALCS and stopped scoring on that night, and for the rest of the month!

In the World Series, TB hit into six double-plays.  After deducting the time in the 3rd inning of game 1 when the bases were loaded and the time in the 5th inning of game 5 when Rocco Baldelli was on base (whose speed has declined with each year of his career), we are left with four double-plays hit into when the runner on first had not been thrown out stealing all month.  Besides setting the tone in game 1 with two GIDPs, Upton did it twice more:  in the 7th inning of game 2 with Bartlett on base and in the 8th inning of the deciding 5th game with Carl Crawford on base.  Both of these errors were heinous failures by Joe Maddon and not by BJ Upton.  In the first case, Upton's DP-grounder came after a 3-2 count:  If Maddon had given Bartlett the green light, Jason certainly would have had found a pitch on which to run somewhere in that mix.  In tonight's game, Upton bounced into the DP on the first pitch:  Had Maddon wanted Crawford to steal, he'd have ordered Upton to take a few pitches.  Clearly, Maddon didn't (and doesn't) get it.  Until a battery proves it can throw you out, there is absolutely no risk in sending the runner.  Yet, when you're bouncing into more than one DP per game, the risk is in not sending the runner!

Shifting gears to the mismanagement of the bullpen, let's handle this by reviewing tonight's game from the point at which it was resumed in the bottom of the 6th inning, because Joe Maddon blew it right out of the gate (reminiscent of Bobby Hurley before facing UNLV in the NCAA Tourney).  The situation coming out of Monday's postponement was for Grant Balfour to face a PH for Cole Hamels to open the Phillies' half of the 6th inning.  Now everyone, except obviously Joe Maddon, knew that the Phillies' three best hitters on its bench were left-handed (Dobbs, Stairs, and Jenkins) and that Grant Balfour has been a nervous wreck these past few weeks (he literally lost his Mojo when uncharacteristically called on to pitch with a 7-0 lead in ALCS game 5 and had yielded 7 hits and 7 walks, with only 3 strikeouts, in his last 5 innings coming into tonight).  Charlie Manuel knew this too.  In fact, the reason Manuel opted to go with his 3rd-best option at this point was because he fully expected Maddon to counter with a LHP after Jenkins was announced.  Manuel will never admit this publicly, because he doesn't want to demean Geoff Jenkins, but Charlie fully expected to burn Jenkins with the pitching change that never came.

Maddon was supposed to pull Balfour for a left-hander, knowing that Manuel's best PH versus a LHP was his backup catcher, Chris Coste, who's done virtually nothing since the All-Star break and has just one single in five post-season at bats.  We all knew that, because TB had the pitcher's slot due up fourth in the next inning, Maddon wouldn't waste David Price for what might be one inning.  Plus, with Jason Werth due up third in this inning, Maddon wouldn't want to start the 6th inning with J.P. Howell.  Thus, the decision to switch to Trever Miller should have been self-evident. 

Maddon has the enviable luxury of having three quality left-handed relievers and he doesn't even know how to leverage the asset.  Sending Grant Balfour back out there, after he's had 46 hours to get himself wound up, was a formulaic move made without any realization of what had changed with his pitcher's psyche. 

If Maddon's mismanagement of his bullpen was inconceivably bad in the 6th inning, it only got worse in the 7th inning when he didn't pull J.P. Howell for a pinch-hitter.  With Pat Burrell due up first in the bottom of the 7th, what was he ever thinking?  Howell is a situation lefty who wouldn't be pitching much past Burrell anyway and, with Burrell's slugging percentage against LHP over the past four years consistently sitting at .550, why would he ever want Howell pitching to him in the first place?  With Zobrist and Hinske both available on the bench and slugging .500 versus RHP, how could Maddon waste the chance to pinch hit for Howell (who came in with 10 major-league at bats and no sacrifice bunts in his career)?

Even the announcers were shocked.  Everyone, again except Joe Maddon, had expected David Price to pitch the 7th and 8th innings.  After all, wasn't the only reason Price didn't pitch the 6th was because Tampa would want to be able to pinch hit for the pitcher in the top of the 7th?  How on earth could anyone deserving a paycheck forget this?

But, wait, it gets worse.  After Howell allows a monstrous double to Burrell (only the October wind kept that ball in the park, as Burrell would have sent it 20 rows back in August), Maddon then calls on sidewinder Chad Bradford.  What?  Knowing that Victorino would attempt to bunt the pinch-runner over to thirdbase, the last thing Tampa should have wanted was a groundball pitcher.  With only one out and Bruntlett on thirdbase, the situation demanded a strikeout pitcher.  The call had to be for either David Price or Edwin Jackson.  Nope, Joe Maddon was sticking with Bradford, whose second pitch to Pedro Feliz was grounded up the middle.  The fact that it wasn't fielded (because the infield was in) is irrelevant, as the run would have scored either way on the grounder to short.

Thus, by the time Maddon gets around to summoning David Price in the 8th inning, the damage had been done and his team was set to face Brad Lidge with nothing but the bottom of its order to stave off defeat. 

Don't get me wrong.  I know it sounds as if I think Joe Maddon is worthless.  He's anything but.  He's done a fantastic job of getting this team to believe in itself and stand up to the Yankees and Red Sox.  He's seemingly had a positive hand in developing his young talent.  However, it's all that young talent that, until October, has been masking his inadequacies as a game strategist.  He's like a great trainer who tries to pull double duty as a jockey.  While he's done a great job to condition the race horse, he's incapable of riding it in a race against comparable thoroughbreds.  Despite working with vastly inferior starting pitching, Charlie Manuel thrashed Joe Maddon head-to-head.  He literally chewed him up and spit him out in a fashion we see far more often in January football than in October baseball.

Kudos to Charlie Manuel and his indefatigable Phightin' Phils!  They may not have been the best team in the World Series or in the National League (or even in their own division, had the Mets pitchers stayed healthy), but Charlie whupped three media favorites to get his ring (Willie Randolph, Joe Torre, and now Joe Maddon).

******

P.S.  Nothing against super-sub Ben Zobrist, but what was Joe Maddon ever doing in the 9th inning when he pinch-hit for Rocco Baldelli?  Wasn't it Baldelli who had just homered against Ryan Madson?  This is another case of Maddon's rigid adherence to a silly baseball adage:  he wanted a left-handed hitter against the right-handed Brad Lidge.  It didn't matter that Baldelli was the only player who had homered in the game for either team.  And it didn't matter that Baldelli was a former 1st-round draft pick (after all, that didn't prompt him to use David Price when needed), whereas Zobrist was a 6th-round pick by the Astros who has never projected to be an everyday player, much less a star.  Worst of all, I'm willing to bet that Joe Maddon doesn't even realize that Baldelli's slugging percentage over the past four years, including the 2008 post-season, is actually higher versus righties (.483) than it is versus lefties (.461).  I'll go you one better:  I'll guarantee you that Maddon didn't realize that Baldelli was only 1-for-15 versus LHP in the playoffs, but (get this) 3-for-5 versus RHP (with 2 HRs and an RBI-single).  That's a 1.800 slugging percentage that Maddon didn't find worthy of facing Brad Lidge.

Okay, now that I'm fuming all over again, let's get into Maddon's other mistake in the 9th inning:  why didn't he have Fernando Perez steal third also?  While it was nice that Maddon had the common sense to pinch-run for the slowest guy on his team (Navarro) with the fastest guy on his bench, how could he not send him twice?  Brad Lidge was a perfect 47-for-47 in save situations, with an ERA of 1.95 and only 2 homeruns allowed all year.  Maddon needed to try to score the tying run on an out or a wild pitch (Lidge has thrown 30 WP over the past four years).  With Brad Lidge on the hill, the only thing less likely than Tampa tying the game on a hit from Ben Zobrist or Eric Hinske would have been getting Perez thrown out attempting to steal third base.  In the past three years, basestealers are 18-1 running on Lidge (and the one he and Chris Coste caught was slow-footed Dan Uggla, who was thrown out 5 of 10 times this year and 12 of 25 times in his career).  Lidge doesn't even pay attention to runners and the fleet-footed Fernando Perez has never been thrown out in his short major-league career.  Not that we can assume Zobrist would have gotten the same pitch or hit it with the same swing had Perez gotten to third base, but we can state with surety that Fernando would have tug up and tied the game on a line drive to the OF like the one Zobrist hit.  Disappointed as Zobrist must be that his rocket was hit right at Jason Werth, how sick must he feel that Joe Maddon deprived him of a chance to hit a game-tying sac fly in a World Series?

Seriously, how do owners put the full faith of their mega-million dollar enterprises in the hands and strategically challenged minds of baseball managers without supporting them with professional tacticians, statisticians, and/or game strategists?

Before I start trashing Joe Maddon's late-game performance in Game 5 of the ALCS, let me tip my cap to the resilient Red Sox offense.  It's doubtful that any MLB team (other than the indefatigable Phightin' Phils) could have ever (and I do mean EVER) pulled that game out.  The Red Sox have always thrived on wearing out pitchers -- working the count and fouling off tough pitches -- until a mistake is thrown.  In the 8th inning, with two outs and a full count, Coco Crisp fouled off four straight pitches before singling to RF to tie the game.  In the 9th inning, with two outs and a 2-2 count, Kevin Youkilis similarly fouled off four straight pitches before singling to 3B.  Two key at bats and a total of eight 2-strike foul balls.  Contrast that to how meekly the Dodgers went down the prior night when facing elimination:  in the entire nine innings, the Dodgers only hit six 2-strike foul balls (and half of those were by ex-Red Sox hitters, Manny and Nomar, with Matt Kemp contributing the other three).

On to Joe Maddon.  Partway through six innings, it appeared as if he had righted every wrong from Game 1.  He continued to have the team running and, this time around, he had his hitters looking at pitches.  By running Dice-K's pitch count up to 68 through three innings, the Rays had ensured an early exit for Matsuzaka.  I was ready to graduate Joe Maddon from my school of baseball strategy.

Ah, but it couldn't be that easy.  Sensing the game in hand with a 7-0 lead in the 6th, Maddon stopped managing, stopped gambling, and eventually stopped winnng.  Sure, some will blame BJ Upton for playing too shallow against Kotsay in the 8th and Longoria for hurrying his throw on Youkilis' ground ball in the 9th.  But, Maddon made major mistakes regarding strategy and personnel.  Here's my chronological list of how he quit thinking and ultimately cheated his team out of its best chance to win:

1) With LHP Hideki Okajima on the hill in the 6th inning, Maddon didn't pinch hit for LHB Gabe Gross.  Not only was Gross hitless in the series and 1-for-13 in the playoffs at that point, but he hit a weak .191 vs LHP during the season with a putrid BB/K ratio of 5/23.  In game two, when Gross was due to face Okajima, Maddon pinch hit with Ben Zobrist (who hit a more powerful .269 vs LHP during the season with an impressive BB/K ratio of 11/11).  Why not now?  If not Zobrist, what about Fernando Perez, who hit .292 with 5 walks in just 29 PA versus LHP.  Heck, with Carlos Pena already having bunted for a base hit versus Okajima, Perez could have tried the same.  The repercussions: 

• Gross pulled up early trying to field Pedroia's fly ball in the 8th (which gave the Sox their first run and set up Big Papi's 3-run homer).  Perez and possibly Zobrist catch that ball, thereby ending the inning and preventing four runs from scoring. 
• Gross struck out in the 8th on three pitches, after which he still was not removed from the lineup for a speedier defensive replacement.
• On Crisp's single in the bottom of the 8th, Gross unfurled a terrible throw that ruined any chance of gunning down Kotsay at the plate and keeping the lead. 

2) In the top of the 7th inning, with no outs, Maddon didn't send BJ Upton and Carlos Pena on a double steal to position one more run to score on a fly ball.  Why not?  With Jonathan Papelbon on the hill, Jason Varitek hasn't thrown out a basestealer in over two years.  And, counting the post-season, BJ Upton has 46 steals.  And, here's the killer:  earlier in the inning, Maddon had sent Jason Bartlett and Akinori Iwamura on a double steal that enabled both to score on Upton's ensuing double!  Why not do it again?  Why let up on the throttle?  It's not as if Evan Longoria didn't give them a chance to run.  After all, he looked at a total of five pitches before grounding into his double-play.  I struggle to believe it's a coincidence that TB never scored again.  Maddon thought the game was over and was invoking the mercy rule.  Problem is they aren't playing youth sports and calling the game when it gets lopsided. 

3) In the bottom of the 7th inning, when David Ortiz came up with two men on base, Maddon didn't lift RHP Grant Balfour for one of his lefty specialists.  Balfour had labored through five batters, throwing 23 pitches.  He hadn't struck out any of the five, yielding three hits and two fly outs to center.  There was nothing about his game tonight that warranted keeping him in, especially since he's used to doing short work.  When the Fat Man hit Balfour's 25th pitch of the inning into the RF bleachers to make it 7-4, Maddon had no one to blame but himself.  Counting this series, Ortiz is 1-for-12 lifetime versus Trever Miller and 1-for-11 versus JP Howell (both of whom, amazingly, had identical regular-season numbers against left-handed batters -- 30 strikeouts and only 1 HR allowed by each).  Why leave Balfour in?  How much longer would he have worked beyond Ortiz anyway?

4) In the top of the 9th inning, with the game suddenly tied at 7, Bartlett and Upton were aboard with one out.  Combined, the two have stolen 69 bases this year, counting the playoffs.  Bartlett was second in the AL at stealing 3rd base and earlier in the game had gotten his 10th (in the double steal with Iwamura).  Now he'd be running with the even faster BJ Upton behind him.  On the hill was rookie Justin Masterson, against whom only one of ten basestealers had been caught all year.  How on earth could you not send the runners?  In the playoffs against two teams that don't contain the running game well, Tampa was now 16 of 17 stealing.  The game was tied.  Tampa needed a runner on 3rd who could score on an out or a wild pitch.  Maddon needed Masterson to sweat.  He'd just walked Upton on five pitches and was facing Carlos Pena (who owned him with three extra-base hits and a walk in 6 plate appearances).  Make Masterson sweat.  Don't let him off quickly or easily.  Have the runners dance behind him.  Don't let Carlos Pena swing early in the count.  Send them!  Don't...  Oh, no:  Pena grounds into the inning-ending double-play.

Bad enough Maddon shackled his speed after taking the 7-0 lead, but, by doing so, he allowed his hitters to revert to swinging early in the count and taking the pressure off Boston's pitchers.  Meanwhile, he hung Grant Balfour out to dry (instead of going to Trever Miller) and he wore out Dan Wheeler (asking him to throw 33 pitches, despite having two fresh arms in his bullpen, Edwin Jackson and David Price, that have yet to allow a hit in the playoffs). 

In the end, Joe Maddon quit thinking and cheated his team out of a win...  And, maybe, a trip to the World Series.  As soon as they stopped running, they stopped scoring.  In the final three innings of Game 5, TB reverted to the lethargic squad that laid an egg in Game 1.  And Joe Maddon did his finest impersonation of Joe Torre -- grounding his running game to enable the opposition to turn double plays and mismanaging his bullpen to blow a secure lead. 

In the ALCS, TB is a perfect 9-for-9 stealing.  The batters immediately following the successful steals are hitting over .500 and slugging over 1.500 with 7 RBI in 8 at bats.  Hopefully, Joe Maddon will realize that before this weekend and unleash the hounds.  If not, well, he'll have plenty of time to go fishing with Joe Torre come Monday. 

Dang, does that guy learn fast! 

I criticized him for not using his speed and he's fixed that.  Not only do steals put you in scoring position and remove the double-play opportunity, but they rattle the pitcher.  Heck, the mere threat of a steal will rattle a pitcher (just ask Flash Gordon how much seeing Dave Roberts dance in his peripheral vision affected his pitching in the 2004 ALCS).  Tonight, the Rays stole three bases.  The ensuing batter hit a home run after two of those steals and the other drew a walk.  Let's see:  the Rays hit three homers and stole three bases, and two of the homers immediately followed two of the steals.  Coincidence?  Hardly.

I criticized Joe Maddon for some roster decisions and he fixed that.  Recognizing that Willy Aybar homered in his lone career at bat against Boston's game 4 starter, Tim Wakefield, and that Cliff Floyd was 1 for 11 lifetime versus Wakefield, Maddon sat his regular DH versus RHP.  Did it work?  Aybar's 2-run homer in the 3rd inning finished off Wakefield and put the game out of reach at 5-0.

The real test comes Thursday.  If the Rays force Dice K to throw strikes and get his pitch count up early, then Maddon will have completely redeemed himself and proven that Game 1 was an aberration.