Perhaps it's because I'm right, and the truth just stings too much. Several Suns fans have lambasted me for my bias against Mike D'Antoni and Steve Nash. I've been accused of "lacking credibility" because my Mavs' fanaticism gets in the way of an objective opinion. I don't think that's true. I simply stated that D'Antoni and Nash will never win a championship as long as they emphasize the run-and-gun at the expense of any semblance of a defensive focus. The saddest thing about this year for Suns' fans should have been watching the two of them defend their style at the post-game press conferences. Nash said that this year really proved that the run-and-gun can win a championship because the Suns got so far while being shorthanded. D'Antoni left his press conference nearly in tears, as he surely lamented "what could have been" if the Suns hadn't been ravished by injuries. After listening to Nash and D'Antoni, Suns' fans shouldn't expect change in the near future. Instead, they're going to have to learn the hard way that the run-and-gun will lose even with a healthy Amare Stoudemire. This time, I'm backing up my proclamation with economic theory. Let's start with the basics. What is the most telling statistic for winning basketball games? Of course, it's point differential, which is the difference between points scored and points allowed. But what combination of statistics is most important in determining who has more points? I'm going to postulate that it's: (2 x FG% x shot attempts) + FTs made. I multiply (FG% x shot attempts) by 2 because of a field goal's actual worth in a basketball game; free-throws count for only one point in the formula. Obviously, this formula discounts three-point shooting, but for the sake of a simple model, I'm hypothesizing that the the additional points gained from three-point shooting are normally cancelled out by a team's lower success rate on these tries. It's not completely scientific, but at least from the Mavs-Suns series, the numbers show that whoever has the higher (2 x (FG%xshot attempts) + FTs) ends up winning. Game 1: Mavs: (2 x .505 FG% x 93 shots) + 21 FTs = 114 Suns: (2 x .55 FG% x 85 shots) + 22 FTs = 116.01 Result: Suns win, 121-118 Game 2: Mavs: (2 x .475 x 80) + 25 = 101 Suns: (2 x .449 x 89) + 8 = 87.922 Result: Mavs win, 105-98 Game 3: Mavs: (2 x .411 x 95) + 13 = 91.09 Suns: (2 x .427 x 82) + 11 = 81.028 Result: Mavs win, 95-88 Game 4: Mavs: (2 x .418 x 79) + 16 = 82.044 Suns: (2 x .544 x 79) + 13 = 98.952 Result: Suns win, 106-86 Game 5: Mavs: (2 x .472 x 89) + 24 = 108.016 Suns: (2 x .456 x 79) + 19 = 91.048 Result: Mavs win, 117-101 Game 6: Mavs: (2 x .474 x 78) + 25 = 98.944 Suns: (2 x .500 x 72) + 15 = 87 Result: Mavs win, 102-93 Okay, I'll admit that there's nothing earth-shattering about my formula. After all, this really only says that teams should maximize their field-goal percentage, shot attempts, and free throws. But what I do find interesting is how the formula predicts the results of every game without using three-point shooting as a factor. I would need to do a more extensive statistical analysis of all NBA games this year, but I have a hypothesis that 3-point shooting is the most overrated statistic in the NBA. Like baseball GM Billy Beane's realization in "Moneyball" that stolen base attempts ultimately hinder a team's chance of scoring runs, three-point shooting might have no correlation to winning basketball games. If so, then Mike D'Antoni's run-and-gun philosophy takes a big hit, for D'Antoni continually stresses the three-point shot in the Suns' game. My theory is that the three-pointer only hurts a team's chances of success because it has the potential of reducing a team's field-goal percentage. Furthermore, three-point shooting teams are less likely to attack the rim, which leads to fewer foul calls, and, thus, fewer free-throws. So, three-point shooting hurts two areas in my model: field-goal percentage and free throws. Second, the model reveals why defense plays such a vital role in winning basketball games. First, by contesting an opponent's shots, a good defense lowers the opposing team's field-goal percentage. Another vital aspect of good D is defensive rebounding. By getting the defensive rebounds, a team minimizes the opposing team's offensive rebounds. Since offensive rebounds result in more shot attempts, preventing the opposition from getting the offensive boards minimizes the opposition's shot attempts. We saw that in the Mavs-Suns series, where the Mavs prevented the Suns from being a factor on the offensive glass, as the Mavs grabbed more rebounds in every game. As a result, the Suns only exceeded the Mavs' shot attempts in one game (it was Game 2, and that aberration is explained by Dallas tripling the Suns' free-throw total -- potential Mavs' shots ended up being trips to the line). A third aspect of good defense is turnovers, as these also reduce the opposing team's shot attempts. So, to summarize, there are three areas in which defense can influence your score in my model: 1. Defensive Rebounding: reduces opponent's shot attempts by preventing them from getting offensive boards 2. Contesting Shots: reduces opponent's field-goal percentage 3. Turnovers: reduces opponent's shot attempts Now, I'm going to return to my criticism of D'Antoni's philosophy (which, at the same time, praises Avery Johnson's defensive emphasis). I'm somewhat an economist, so I'm going to revert to economic-speak in this analysis. Economics is the study of the allocation of scarce resources. Whenever a team plays the Suns, defense is a scarce resource for the Suns, as they don't focus on it. As a result, there's a "market" for this scarce resource, and its value becomes much higher because of its scarcity. For example, when the Mavs contest a shot, they are lowering the Suns' ultimate field-goal percentage. If the Suns, likewise, contested a Mavs' shot on the other end, the Mavs' field-goal percentage would be lowered to a similar degree, creating a wash. However, when the Mavs are the only ones exerting effort at contesting shots, they're lowering the Suns' FG% from its base level (and, granted, the Suns' base level of FG% is very high), while the Mavs' FG% remains at its base level. But the rebounding differential was the big key. D'Antoni doesn't emphasize defensive rebounding, as his philosophy seems to be content with a below-average defensive-rebounding effort. D'Antoni would rather have his wingmen streaking down the court so that once the Suns eventually come up with the defensive rebound, they have an easy basket on the other end. That's a partially sound philosophy because it increases the Suns' FG% by increasing their number of easy shots. At the same time, D'Antoni's strategy leaves the Suns shorthanded in their attempts to grab the defensive rebounds, which leads to more offensive second-chances for the opposition. I believe that the increased number of second-chance shots given to the Mavs more than outweighed the advantage that the Suns gained by getting easy looks on the other end. The Mavs grabbed offensive boards so frequently in this series that they ended up with more shot attempts in almost every game. And when the offensive rebounds didn't result in extra shot attempts, they often were responsible for the Mavs' trips to the free-throw line, as the Suns fouled the Mavs to prevent them from getting easy baskets. My model seems to support my theory. Let's look at the marginal return from getting an easy fastbreak basket, as compared to an opponent's marginal return from getting an extra shot. The fastbreak basket doesn't actually add a shot for the Suns because they would have that shot if they rebounded the Mavs' initial miss. So, the fastbreak basket would only improve the Suns' field-goal percentage. Let's assume that the Suns are 100-percent successful on fastbreak opportunities, and that they average 80 shots per game. If they normally hit 45 percent of their field-goal tries, they would have 36 field goals in a hypothetical game. Adding a fastbreak basket would make them 37 for 81, which is 45.7 percent. So, one additional fastbreak basket adds .7 percent to the Suns' ultimate field-goal percentage. In my model, the .7 extra on the field-goal percentage is multiplied by two to produce 1.4 extra "points." On the other side of the coin, if the Suns allow an opponent to get an extra shot, the extra shot is worth 2 "points" in my model (2 x 1). This shows that a fastbreak opportunity is 7/10 as valuable as an extra shot. Thus, in order for the Suns' strategy to work, they would have to get 10 fastbreak opportunities for every seven offensive rebounds that they give up to an opponent. In the Mavs-Suns series, the Suns had 110 fastbreak points, which is about 55 fastbreak baskets. Meanwhile, the Mavs had 85 offensive rebounds. For the Suns' strategy to have worked, they would have needed 121 fastbreak opportunities to compensate for their complete lack of defensive rebounding (the math is 10/7 x 85). They got less than half of that. Finally, I have no problem with D'Antoni in terms of his emphasis on turnovers. The Suns are a hustling, active team that gets plenty. Also, D'Antoni's run-and-gun scheme loves turnovers because they lead to fastbreak points. In this series, however, the two teams pretty much matched each others' turnovers in all but two games (Mavs had a big edge in winning Game 3, while Suns had a big edge in winning Game 4). Thus, turnovers were a bit of a wash in terms of impacting my model. So, there you have it. D'Antoni will never win an NBA championship until he starts allocating his resources towards the defensive part of the game. Otherwise, smart coaches like Avery Johnson will create such a differential in the defensive categories that the Suns have to shoot lights-out in order to win. In this series, Avery's defense lowered the Suns' FG% and reduced their shot attempts. Plus, Avery emphasized attacking the rim as opposed to three-point shooting, which led to far more free throws for the Mavs. When D'Antoni said at the beginning of the series that the Suns could win by outshooting the Mavs in 4 out of 7 games, he only had one-third of the equation correct. D'Antoni forgot about the impact of an opponents' shot attempts and free throws. As a result, he's enjoying an early summer vacation, and Suns' fans should get used to it.