To understand the Washington Nationals, one has to watch them. One cannot grasp the stinkiness of this fish from the head and down, simply by watching the "highlights." This is a gang that can't shoot straight. Heck, they rarely misfire to at least hit the guy in the tree by accident. At this point, there is a piling-on effect going on in the Nation's Capital. For those outside the beltway, kick your feet up and rejoice in your Pirates/Royals/Reds fandom.
B.(D)C.
There was something that was always alluring to baseball brass about having baseball in Montreal. After all, it is North America's sixth largest city. To boot, having your sport broadcast in three languages (English in US/Canada, Spanish in Mexico and the Caribbean, and French in Quebec) gives it a reach that surpasses football, basketball, and hockey.
MLB tried to hold out hope that baseball could work in Montreal. After the strike in 1994, what was already a hockey town was solidified as a hockey town. Attendance at the disasterous Stade-Olympique was now in the thousands, whereas other teams measured it in tens of thousands.
From a scouting standpoint, the Expos were the gold standard. We're talking about a franchise that gave us Randy Johnson, Andres Galarraga, Pedro Martinez, Cliff Floyd, Kevin Youkilis, and Vlad Guerrero. There are others, but this is not a "name as many Expos as you can" sporcle quiz. Despite all the talent, the team (which eventually became a partnership of the other owners) knew that players would not play for meager Expos money after their six years of service was up. Move the talent, restock the system, and hope that the new players can compete was the strategy.
Eventually, enough was enough. The team had to find a revenue stream if it wanted to compete. The owners had this sinking ship on their ledgers. In what port should they dock it?
They're Heeeeeere!
Speculation was rampant that baseball would return to the Nation's Capital. Severel prominent businessmen had long banged the drum, but couldn't get the deal done to move the Padres, A's, or other flavor of the month. This is where DC had an advantage. Take the NFL's Ravens and Rams. The league spurned their expansion bids when Charlotte and Jacksonville joined the league, but they got themselves into the conversation. DC was the one market that had always been in the conversation (at least after the Rays existence blocked the ever-present St Pete threat).
Radio pundits' hearts fluttered at the prospect. "There's nowhere else for them to go!" Of course Las Vegas, Charlotte, Indianapolis, Columbus, and Portland could be called viable candidates. Three of those cities are larger than DC. Also, the city has had two teams in the past (though the creation of the Twins was a wink-wink defensive move against the CBL). Even if one disregards that point, the city's affluent usually turns over every 4-8 years. How can that sustain a fan base?
Orioles owner Peter Angelos once said, "Everyone knows there are no true baseball fans in DC. It's a fiction." DC radio and print media jumped all over this quote. "He's blocking us again." "He's forcing us to like his poor excuse for a baseball team." "Baltimore is not Washington!" The funny thing about this exchange was that the shoe was on the other foot when football was the subject. Looking at attendance figures for the new ballpark in (spoiler) DC, maybe we should cut Pete a break on that one?
Now, the DC suburbs create a different scenario in terms of market size, and northern opposition. What if the ballpark is built in Northern Virginia? This would serve the affluent customer that is more likely to be a permanent resident. The hassle of getting home from work, and then the family downtown for the game would be minimized. The one boondoggle: find 9000 square feet of grass in Northern Virginia.
So Mayor Anthony Williams had a plan. The ballpark would be built by the Anacostia River in Southeast DC. The ballpark would be the anchor for development in this economically challenged area. Of course, with no ownership group in place, the city was on the hook for financing. Now DC Councilwoman Linda Cropp had a plan - kill the Stadium, and get those Southeast DC mayoral votes.
On December 14, 2004 Linda Cropp amended stadium financing legislation to include $300 million in private financing. Without an owner, that meant that the other owners would be on the hook for a stadium that their teams would play in but nine times per season - tops. This was a deal breaker. The makeshift stands and trailers selling Nationals merchandise outside RFK Stadium were ordered closed until further notice. Washington DC had until December 31, 2004 to get a deal in place.
Eventually, a deal was in place that purchased insurance for cost overruns. Also, the mayor was compelled to search for private financing, but did not have to secure it. You could once again but a curly W cap.
RFK and Stan Kasten
RFK is a vestige of good DC sports times. The DC Sports and Entertainment Commission just can't let her go. Having the Nationals play there for two seasons was an opportunity for fans to get one last look at what Redskins fans saw.
RFK is a vestige of American sports' past. It's a concrete donut. It has no character compared to other stadia. Its concession stands didn't take debit cards. The concourses couldn't fit the lines and the beer carts that are prevalent at baseball games. The stadium's concessions contractor was essentially playing out the string. The stadium staff definitely did not exude that "Welcome Home" vibe shown by the staff up north.
Enter Stan Kasten - Ted Turner's former right hand man responsible for the Braves' renaissance. Well, at least he was responsible for it from a window dressing perspective. As far as putting together a baseball operation, time seems to cast John Schuerholz in a brighter light. One needs only to compare John's Braves to Frank Wren's Braves.
Stan Kasten is a guy you want when you want plant some flowers in front of the park, or to lay some carpet at the gates. I'm not trying to hatchet the guy, but he's a salesman. He was there to make RFK palletable, and to take a minority stake in ownership. Also, he was supposed to occasionally go onto enemy radio and encourage their fans to come see the new ballpark (as he did this season with Philadelphia). He probably shouldn't be involved in the baseball operation.
Jim Bowden
There's a reason that Stan Kasten wound up running the baseball operation. His name is Jim Bowden. For whatever reason, Bowden fancies himself a star. He thinks he belongs on TV. One season on ESPN does that to a guy. Someone should tell Jim that ESPN hires everyone for a season. The guy should stick to generally managing baseball clubs. Or maybe he shouldn't...
I would like to present a well-written paragraph or two on Jim Bowden's tenure; however, he is his own retrospective. Instead, I'll summarize Jim Bowden in the style of Billy Joel's, "We Didn't Start The Fire."...
Brian Lawrence for Castilla...Didn't even pitch in Hialeah...WilyMo Pena...Felipe Lopez...Austin Kearns Reds-mania...Alfonso Soriano, what a steal...What the heck, no deadline deal?...draft pick compensation when the Cubs took the left fielder-second baseman...that's fine...Aaron Crow's gonna sign...Oh wait nevermind...[Chorus]
John Rauch has to go...sent him for Bonafacio...now he's a Marlin...who'd they get, George Carlin?...Bowden likes a projecta...Let's get a baby-sitter for Elijah...Church and Schneider gone...But Milledge and LoDuca's mouth are here...Now for Manny Acta's job I fear...Why'd they give Dmitri Young two years?[Chorus]
Chad Cordero has to go...On TV Bowden did say so...Jose Rijo is a scout...Who's Smiley Gonzalez?...We'll find out...Federal investagations...Nats fans implore....They can't take it anymore!
The Lerners
Someone has to be a willing party to all of this. Mark Lerner is shagging batting practice balls. Well, then again, it could be the alleged Kevin Elster type. Ted Lerner seems to like the idea of being the guy who owns the team that came to DC lo these many years.
The problem with sports ownership in general, is that the team is a secondary property. Fans don't want to hear this. Either the owner uses profits from a primary venture to dump into the team, or the owner gouges the fans in order to run the team. When your business is malls, and the real estate bubble has burst, you're probably doing the latter.
The Stadium
For $5-$10 you can get a walk-up seat in two sections of the ballpark. The problem is, those are gone if you are at the back of the line. From there, there are $18 dollar seats. That's fine. What is obsene are the $35 seats. In these sections, you don't have to be bothered with the pesky content of the jumbotron. You're under it. You get the excitement of watching other fans react to deep flyballs in right field. And you don't have to bother watching the Presidents race that all the other fans find fun for some reason.
It is tiring to hear from the DC media, "Bear in mind. They are still new at this." It is also tiring to hear, "We haven't had basbeall here for three decades. People aren't just going to come to the ballpark overnight." But wait a second. What about all the talk of "there's no place else for this team to go?" Wouldn't that imply that this town was the only town capable of packing a stadium? Shouldn't a new stadoium provide a marked boost in attendance? The writing was on the wall since Cincinnati built their park. The baseball stadium as must-see became a cliche.
The Team
Oh the team! Ah, the team. Eh the team. It's the errors stupid. And the pitching. And the lack of walking.
The errors. I'm not an error-as-stat guy. Errors fail to account for many things. One, hometown scorekeepers willing to give Jeter, Pedroia, Suzuki, or anyone else every chance to bolster their hit totals. Two, you can't botch what you can't get to in the first place. Some call this "the Derek Jeter is a better shortstop than A-Rod principle." Finally, variations in ballparks and fould territory lend themselves to varying opportunities for teams to make errors.
All in all, a team gives their opponents more outs than the error column would indicate. So bear that in mind when I say that the Nats have committed 77 errors in 81 games. The Major League average is 50. The old and slow Yankees have 42. Their counterpart in the AL (Seattle) has 62.
The bullpen is bad. This team has tried to force the closer role on Joel Hanrahan to no avail. Julian Tavarez walks more people than a crossing guard. Joe Beimel is okay, but can't seem to start his own inning. Ron Villone started strong, but bullpen stats can be deceiving, since inherited runners aren't factored into ERA. Jesus Colome.
The lineup has potential. If Nyjer Morgan can be a .400 OBP guys, then I'll have to do a similar retrospective on the Pirates. Zimmerman and Guzman can be .300 BA guys to get Morgan home. Dunn can be a .500 SLG guy to get them off the bases. The bottom of the order needs help, as does the bench. There is a serious drop off in everything if Dunn or Nick Johnson are swapped in a double-switch.
PR
I'll round things out with some bullet points on PR:
The team fined Elijah Dukes $500 for being late to the ballpark for pre-game activities. Dukes was performing community work with a Virignia little-league. The league raised the money to pay the fine.
On April 17th, the team's two best players took the field with "Natinals" uniforms.
The owners, citing a lengthy punch list of things invisible to fans, refused to pay rent on their publicly funded stadium.
The Nationals were the only team that did not send a representative to the industry meetings or scouting schools in 2008.
The only sell-outs at the new park in 2008 occurred on opening night, and against the Orioles.
Just recently, a minor one. The fireworks button was pressed signifying a Nats victory - after a Brian McCann foul ball. This would have been hilarious had McCann taken the next pitch to the right field porch.
Well there it is. While the rest of baseball focuses on the Dodgers, Yanks, and Sox, IJWMFTT brings you 360 Nats coverage. This is the type of analysis that you just can't get anywhere else. Ha!
Note: Here is another reposting from the changeover. Again, I'll add the basics of the exchange I had with sportthink.
Now that IJWMFTT is back in the saddle (part time at least), I usually keep the radar on for an interesting topic for discussion. Last night, as I tried to stay awake long enough to see Mariano Rivera bat, Joe Morgan provided not one, but two face palm moments. It were as if Joe had found out about Billy Mays, and wanted to give two for the price of one as a tribute.
The first face palm moment came when Joe spurned the basic tenet of baseball, don't get out. "I know some people in baseball who will disagree with me, but I don't feel that every time you make an out trying to steal, that it's a bad play." If I could channel Michigan State's Mike Valenti for a moment: Outs are not Cingular rollover minutes. You don't get to take two of them in the third, and then say "Okay ump, we're going to use that extra out in the eighth."
In this instance, Joe confused the result with the ideal. Ideally, getting another base takes the decision out of the manager's hands. The bunt is no longer needed. The line drive double play on a hit and run is taken out of the equation. Managing is an easy job when the directive is swing away. To that end, a stolen base is almost always a great idea.
That said, an idea does not always produced the desired result. Outs are outs. In very few situations are outs not considered a bad play. Some will point to the sacrifice fly as an example of that. I point to the guy on third in that situation. If he isn't there, then all you have is a run of the mill fly-out. The sacrifice bunt is also cited as an example. We've been down this road so many times with that play; nonetheless, I guess if you need A RUN and it winds up yielding that result, then the ends justified the means. If it doesn't work, then we get what the idea was, but the result indicated that the idea was a bad one. It's a results driven business.
To the credit of Steve Phillips (yeah I had to read that sentence twice), he cited the Yankees 88% stolen base rate as an example of a team that could take on the risk of more attempts. I have mixed feelings about the concept, especially since agreeing with Phillips seemingly contradicts my criticism of Joe Morgan's position. I guess I'm holding back criticism of Phillips because he cited the number, and I'm filling in his blanks (many have ran the analyses and determined that any stolen base percentage below 75% is detrimental). All that said, the 12% that were outs were still bad plays. Outs are outs.
Context is a huge part of analysis. Take the Yankees, and their 88% stolen base rate. Am I more inclined to send runners at Yankee Stadium or Citi Field? I'm sending those runners at Citi since my line-up is conducive to hitting home runs at Yankee Stadium. This is the analysis that's missing from the analysis of the games. As I stated last week, I wonder if Joe makes blanket statements without context, just to get guys like me in a flutter.
***
Okay I promised two for the price of one. I was incredulous over Joe Morgan's incredulity at the Jeter/Rivera situation. Joe wanted to know the logic behind throwing Derek Jeter a first pitch strike in the ninth inning. After all, a weaker hitter was (presumably) coming to the plate in the name of Mariano Rivera.
Here's the logic: Get ahead in the count. Jeter, assuming a pitch around, isn't swinging at the first pitch. Throw a strike and get ahead in the count. Now, throw two pitches down and away to see if Jeter goes fishing. If he takes both, then put Jeter on base. I thought Jerry Manuel played this right.
Pitching with the bases loaded is a different animal than having a base open. If Rivera decides not to bail out Rodriguez, there's nowhere to put him. And that's exactly what happened. Of course, had Rivera struck out, we'd hear more harping over that first strike to Jeter.
[Columbo]Oh and there's just...one...more...thing. Joe Girardi was well within his rights to pinch hit for Rivera. What if the Mets put Jeter on base, and up comes a more experienced hitter with the bases loaded? After all, the logic could have been employed, that two more runs essentially eliminates the need to have Rivera in the game in the ninth.
And try this on for an aside: has there ever been a situation where a closer was batting in a situation where he could bat himself OUT of a save situation? Had Rivera, by divine intervention, sent one over the left field fence, that would have happened.
Update: Sportthink wanted some clarification on my first point. And yes, it is akin to the ill-advised three pointer that goes in. "Bad play, bad play, yeah, great play!" Sport then provided an instance where a gamble isn't the worst thing. Typically it's the two out attempt with the batter behind in the count, or stealing with the pitcher up soon. Getting out in both instances is bad, but not a mortal sin.
Kudos to Sportthink who provided the analysis that Joe Morgan had the platform to provide, but decided not to provide it. This was the essence of my article. Morgan could have differentiated the idea behind the play from the result. This is typical Morganalysis.
Note: This is a reposting of an article written during the changeover; however, new material was added. If you already read it, you may want to comment on Michael Kay's buffoonery.
Billy Beane never wrote a book. Billy Beane never had a cute name for his tenure in Oakland. But everyone from MLB Network's Mitch Williams to the broadcast crew of last week's Reds/White Sox game would have you believe it.
Most broadcasts rely on that crutch for some lively fifth inning banter. The scenario usually plays out as such: Player x draws a walk. Player x played for AAA Sacramento, and was a September call-up for the Athletics. "Yep, he's one of those players out of the Oakland system."
And the analyst, as was the case last Saturday in Cincinnati, always takes the bait. The response is some variation of, "Well that Moneyball philosophy isn't working too well lately now is it?" The play by play man, sensing a rant bubbling beneath the surface, plays it one of two ways. One is to agree and move on. The other is to encourage it with some variation of, "It hasn't been successful in recent years has it?"
Of course, if I'm the third man in the booth, I come down on a different side. "Moneyball is quite successful. Michael Lewis got a best-seller out of it. And until last week, it was going to be adapted into a comedy on the big screen." I would then receive two cold stares that say to me, "We're talkin' baseball here, son. Dirt in the uniform, stealing bases, hittin' the cut-off man and such. You're talkin'bout book learnin' during a baseball game." Then I'd have to remind them that Moneyball is a book, and no, Billy Beane did not write it. It would just get ugly from that point.
Billy Beane should get credit for his successes, and be admonished for his failures. He should not be worshipped as a demigod, nor cast as a villain. Beane did what any manager of anything should do - exploit inefficiencies in the marketplace for their employer's benefit. That is what "Moneyball" is.
Of course, one could argue that Beane's greatest failure was declassifying all of it. I am convinced that there are a handful of scouts and GMs out there who would still be scratching their heads over what Oakland was accomplishing. Beane's self-congratulating attitude toward his trades kept other GMs away. The "f-ing A trade" was no longer possible. After all, there's got to be a reason Beane is calling about this guy. With this book in hand, the other GMs knew exactly why.
Beane's success should not be minimized. Aside from Oakland's early decade success, the Red Sox employed similar strategies to win the 2004 and 2007 World Series titles. In essence, to use the euphemism, the Red Sox were playing moneyball, only they did it with more money. I do not mean to say that Billy Beane is responsible for those titles; however, I do mean to say to those who use the term "Moneyball" as a baseball strategy, "It can and has worked."
Another Beane success comes from an analysis of marginal wins. Marginal wins are essentially wins over a baseline versus dollars spent. Some may say that there is no room for this in a winning and losing industry. What I say to that is that everyone has a job and tools with which to do it. Managers maximize their outputs using various inputs, all within an environment that has constraints. Beane's job is to use the right combination of scouts and tools to obtain the best possible talent, given the payroll he has been assigned by his employer.
In 2006, the A's won the division with a $49,000,000 marginal payroll (I stripped out the portion that clubs are obligated to pay, vis-à-vis league minimum). In 2008, that figure was $32,300,000. This year, that figure is back up to $46,000,000.
Overall, the constraints have grown, and the wins have decreased. That said, the A's of the past three seasons have been in the top ten in terms of investment needed per win. Each 2006 win above baseline (Tampa) cost the A's $16,520. Each 2008 win above baseline (DC) cost the A's $26,973. One could surmise that the loss in efficiency came from the increase in constraints. That figure, by the way, ranked seventh behind Florida, Tampa, Minnesota, Milwaukee, LAA, and Arizona. For fun, each of Seattle's two wins above baseline cost them $839,243 to achieve.
You will notice that the A's join the Brewers, Diamondbacks, Blue Jays, Indians, and Twins as the only clubs from 2006-2008 to have above average total wins and a below average payroll.
I think that before we deem the Beane regime a failure, let's see how the 2007 and 2008 drafts pan out (when payroll went down, thus Beane knew that future success would have to come from drafting). The big what if has always been, what could the guy be doing in a constraint-free environment?
Update: As I sat down to watch "The Sports Reporters" on the four letter's Sunday line-up, I flew into a Beane-esque rage over Michael Kay's opening line. In essence, Kay talked about Tim Lincecum's awesomeness. Okay, fair enough. Then he lamented the fact that he just doesn't look like a Major Leaguer.
I would like to say that this was tongue-in-cheek. Perhaps this was something that Kay thought would serve as witty, one-line analysis. What it is, is THE reason why people continue to cite "Moneyball" as a relevant script on baseball.
What part doesn't look Major League? Is it the part where he throws the ball past professional hitters on a regular basis. Is it the part where he makes knees buckle? Is it when he comes off the mound to effectively field his position? Was Jim Abbott Major League enough?
Of course, it should come as no surprise to me that a Yankee employee would say such things. After all, this is the franchise that publicly squabbled with its best player of the 1980s over a moustache. Could you imagine if this element of the Yankees coprorate culture had taken hold in the 1920s?
Yanks: "Mr Frazee. I hear you have a play opening down this way. I can deliver some dough, if you can help get this team of mine out of the doldrums."
Sox: "How about Ruth? He's a good player. I could launch plays on Broadway for the next five years if you took him off my hands."
Yanks: "Ruth? That slob? Doesn't he play with hot dogs in his pocket? A smoker too I hear. Eh, he don't look like a Major League ball player. Send him to the White Sox. That team looks like they'll win a lot titles. He could make them worse. If we took him, I don't know when we'd win. 2005 at the earliest."
Alan "Bud" Selig is rooting hard for a certain NL Central team. Specifically, he is rooting for its best player. It stands to reason that Selig likes Ryan Braun of the Milwaukee Brewers. Blog over, right? Wrong! Bud Selig has to be rooting for Albert Pujols right now.
Why does Selig want Pujols to mash himself into the sixty home run range? It's all about the best interest of the game. Remember that clause? Remember the Mitchell Report that grants the Commissioner full authority to deal with the steroid issue (see my Emperor Bud entry from that period)?
Baseball's two sacred records both deal with the long ball. Both are held by a player who appeared in the Mitchell Report, and has ongiong perjury proceedings related to the matter. Assuming that Selig has all the knowledge to determine that Pujols is clean, Little Al has to be waiting on pins and needles for Big Al to hit number sixty-two. At that point, Selig can reestablish the official single-season home run record.
The Bonds defenders will be quick to chime in that Barry did nothing wrong at the time he hit his seventy-three home runs. As I have documented several times on this blogosphere, steroids have been banned from baseball since 1991. Fay Vincent banned them. Testing is another matter altogether.
Nonetheless, some may say, "why wait to re-write the record?" Well, to whom should it go? If not Bonds, then the next man is McGwire. There is a lot of circumstantial evidence surrounding Big Mac. Giving the record back to him could set MLB up for an egg on the face moment, if the smoking gun is ever found. And let's be real folks, that R word will also be tossed around like a beach ball.
So who is next in line? Sosa! Oh that no longer looks like a great idea. So can baseball really roll the record back to Maris? Probably not good PR to tell the fans, "the past thirty years didn't exist." Then again, I have compared Selig to a sith lord on several occassions.
The fact of the matter is that Selig needs a "post" steroid era player to break the Maris mark in order to re-evaluate the record. It's not that far fetched. Ben Johnson never existed, and apparently, I never saw the Fab 5 play in back-to-back title games.
Records are a bitter history lesson. Once they are broken, the former holder is all but forgotten. Babe Ruth is a glaring exception, and understandably, we aren't quite ready to let go of Hank Aaron. But really, name everyone who has been labeled "fastest man in the world." Name the guy who Lou Gehrig beat for his record. Once all is right with the world, Alan Selig hopes that Albert Pujols is who we'll remember the most.
I often wonder if "old school" analysts like Tim McCarver and Joe Morgan are oblivious to the criticism launched in their direction. Or do they read it, and then find new and zanier ways to attract it? I am starting to think that it's the latter, given what was offered to us as analysis of the Subway Series.
On FOX's broadcast of the Mets/Yankees Saturday game, McCarver extolled the virtues of running hard to first base - sort of. Here is how the game played out at the time: Fernando Martinez hits a ground ball to first that has the potential to be a double play. The Yanks get the out at second. Throw to first...safe. We have seen this play a thousand times in our baseball watching careers.
Now the McCarverism (I'll throw quotes around it if someone Tivoed it and can provide it verbatim) - It is less virtuous to run hard to first base for a base hit than it is to prevent a double play. This in and of itself is baffling, but perhaps defensible. Just be quiet now, Tim, and we'll get to the sixth with our credibility intact. When you are running for a hit, that helps you, whereas avoiding the double play helps the team. Face. Palm.
Let me understand this concept correctly. Let's walk through an example. Following the averted double play, had Jose Reyes hit a gapper, Martinez would have scored. One run posted for the Mets. Had Martinez hit a dribbler to A-Rod, and he beat the throw to first, and later scored on the same gapper, is that merely half a run?
Offensively, your goal is to avoid outs. Intuitively, you understand that an inning continues, so long as the offense avoids the third out. Here is the evidence:
Both events would seem similarly virtuous. In fact, if we are assigning virtuousness to baseball acts, then we should see if the base hit is the more virtuous of the plays. Nobody wants to hit into a rally killing double play. Running hard prevents that stigma. It's not exactly virtuous when the intent is to avoid ridicule.
Let's go one step further. Isn't the better team play to allow your teammates to hit in lower pressure situations? For instance, what if Martinez struck out? Now Reyes is batting with one more out than Martinez was, and with the runners in the same position. So now the "nine ways to score from third" philosophy is reduced to a "get a hit" mandate.
Let's try this on for size as well. Let's leave the infield. What if Martinez hit the ball down the third base line? And what if Xavier Nady quickly cuts off the ball, but supplies a half-hearted throw to the infiled. And what if Martinez, having taken the wide turn, takes advantage of this to stretch his hit to a double? Is this not a virtuous play because doing it means a better slugging percentage? It would seem more virtuous, since the next hitter gets to bat with the pitcher at a disadvantage.
I have never understood the concept of selfish hits, homers, and walks. We hear so much (from managers whose names rhyme with Crusty Faker) that some guys need to get "more aggressive at the plate. Walks are nice. Hits are better. Yadda yadda." The problem is that analysts project walks or whatever else is perceived as selfish as something possibly greater had something else been done. Of course, they fail to realize that there are worse outcomes as well, which can be easily realized by jamming square pegs into round holes. Martinez's job was to safely reach base. The ends would justify the means. Barring that, Martinez's plan B was to prevent the inning from ending. Resorting to plan B wasn't more virtuous, but a necessary component of completing his job.
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