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VeteranCrisis is such a relative term – particularly in soccer. How else can you explain Burnley, with 12 points sitting in 9th position and a goal difference of –10, being regarded as a success while Liverpool are two positions and three points better off and enjoy a goal difference of 9 but are currently the crisis club of the Premier League?
Much of it comes down to the old adage about under promising and over delivering. Burnley supporters have seen their side return to the top flight after a trek through the Football League wilderness that lasted just short of a record set back in biblical times. For Burnley this season, survival equates to success.
However, for Liverpool supporters and many media pundits this was going to be the year that Liverpool won the Premier League for the first time and secured their 19th top flight title after a drought of two decades. Expectations, while always high on Merseyside, were ratcheted up.
The source of the optimism was Liverpool’s performance last season. They collected more points (86) than any other runner up had ever recorded, did the league double over Chelsea and Manchester United, rattled off an amazing 31 points from a possible 33 down the straight all while pushing United to the second last round of play.
Four Premier League defeats in their first nine games this season is just not how it is supposed to be. And now the pressure on the team and coaching staff as they approach Sunday’s match against Manchester United has risen considerably. With a squad that now looks gossamer thin Rafa Benitez has to pull a few bunnies out of the hat if his side is going to take anything away from Sunday’s game at Anfield.
And it is when you take a close look at Liverpool’s squad that you realize how lean it is in compared with their traditional Premier League rivals. So how come Liverpool are in such a predicament?
The answer is, not surprisingly, money and in Liverpool’s case a distinct lack of it. The club just didn’t invest enough to strengthen the squad over the summer nor does it have a raft of promising youngsters ready to break into the first team.
Rafa Benitez has taken a few body and head shots this week as supporters and columnists have lined up to take aim at his transfer record. Such criticism is not only unfair but holds Benitez to a higher standard than the likes of Ferguson, Wenger and a gaggle of managers who have popped into Stamford Bridge for a cup of coffee over the last few years.
Benitez is certainly culpable for some poor buys but he has also made some very good ones as well. Essentially, he is no different than any other manager.
Ferguson’s cupboard contains skeletons of Veron, Kleberson, Liam Miller and Djemba-Djemba while Wenger would like Arsenal fans to forget Giovanni van Bronckhorst, Igor Stepanovs, Francis Jeffers and Pascal Cygan. (Chelsea fans no doubt can come up with an extensive list as well).
The difference is that Manchester United, Chelsea and Arsenal all enjoy some wiggle room while Benitez has none. Liverpool is a club teetering on the financial brink while its business model seems to attract many of the negatives but few of the positives employed by the likes of Arsenal, Manchester United and Chelsea.
Liverpool have moved more aggressively to beef up their academy over the last couple of years but it is far too early for the changes to pay off. Arsenal got a jump on retooling their youth scouting and training operations a few years ago and it has paid off – albeit not as fully as some would demand. Arsenal youngsters may still lack experience but they appear miles ahead in terms of development when compared with Liverpool’s future stars.
Hicks and Gillett followed the path trodden by fellow American Martin Glazer and decided to buy a Premier League club with other people’s money employing a leverage buy-out.
The plan may have been the same but the business fundamentals of Manchester United and Liverpool are very different. By good fortune rather than good planning Manchester United’s reincarnation as the dominant club in England coincided with an unprecedented boom in revenue made available to clubs through TV rights and subsequently the Champions League.
The uptick in revenue has benefited all Premier League clubs but the distribution of riches is very much tilted to the most successful ones and none has been more successful in England over last 15 years than Manchester United.
What is more United’s success has been replicated in foreign markets where they enjoyed a great deal of popularity founded on the Busby Babes of the 50s and Law-Charlton-Best the decade after. (One thing that was down to good planning was the investment United made in Old Trafford which assured the club of a modern facility and spared the expense of building new).
The Glazer business model is a high-wire act with little in the way of safety measures but United’s continued success and popularity has so far provided sufficient cash flow to fund the high cost of borrowing. It is high risk but it enjoys a buffer of cash generation that Liverpool’s owners Hicks and Gillett can only dream of.
The dilemma faced by Hicks and Gillett is compounded by the need to replace Anfield. This has been known for a very long time and was in fact one of the selling points of a Hicks-Gillett ownership group. The financial reality is that the stadium is really no closer to fruition than when David Moores decided to sell to the Americans.
Of course Chelsea can be thrown out as an example of a club that manages to succeed with a stadium that holds around 40,000 so why can’t Liverpool make Anfield work?
The reason is quiet simple – Chelsea has an owner who is filthy rich and when push comes to shove Chelsea does not live or die financially from game day revenues but from the willingness of Roman Abramovich to maintain his interest in the club.
Even then, should the Russian decide to find another toy the only short term casualty will be his bank account. If he put Chelsea up for sale he would take a sizeable – but probably manageable – hit to his personal fortune.
When the Americans bought Liverpool they were viewed as a step or two down from Abramovich when the truth was they were and still are nothing but opportunists looking to make a quick buck. But as Liverpool struggle on the field the chance that Hicks and Gillett will make money on the deal begins to evaporate.
There is blood in the water and any prospective buyer worth his salt is going to circle waiting for the asking price to drop significantly before moving in. For Liverpool fans it might require the loss of a nose to get rid of two unwanted faces.
Who is hot and who is not…a weekly look at the form teams over the last 5 games.
Premier League
Manchester United – 13 points
West Ham – 1 point
Ligue Une
Auxerre - 13 points
Grenoble – 0 points
Bundesliga
Schalke 04 - 12 points
Hertha Berlin – 0 points
Serie A
Inter - 12 points
Livorno – 1 point
La Liga
Barcelona – 13 points
Malaga – 1 point
SPL
Hibernian – 10 points
Kilmarnock and Falkirk – 3 points
MLS
FC Dallas - 12 points
New York Red Bulls – 2 points
gorn:
Ursusarctos"Do you really think [Rafa] was given a negative budget, given a near-miss @ the PL title & a blood-&-guts QF CL loss?"
You assume too much. Who's to say there wasn't a disconnect between what Rafa thought he had, and what he ended up having released to him (or approved)?
And there is another way to spin the "near-miss" rationale – particularly for the eejits on the LFC board: coming so close meant that massive investment was not necessary, since all that was required this summer was to replace departures (GJ and AA) and expect a better injury situation next year. Why invest non-existent money, if all that is required is better luck [sic]?
Never make the mistake with the Duo of assuming that they will invest anything more than the barest, excusable minimum into the club. The manner of their acquisition and the Stanley Park "spade-in-the-ground" games should have given enough warning.
"how do you reconcile Gillett as sHabs owner vs. as LFC co-owner?"
No reconciliation is necessary – it's two sides to the same coin, taking account of the radically different financial contexts between the PL and the NHL.
And who says the midget Duo was a model owner? I've been through this before, debunking the idea that he did a good job as Habs owner.
First, he had nothing to do with the construction of the Bell Centre, so no credit for moving the Habs into a new, larger, more modern arena.
Second, in the 7 full seasons he owned the team (2001 to 2009, ignoring the lockout season), the Habs finished the regular season (in their conference):
8, 10 (missed playoffs), 7, 7, 10 (missed playoffs), 1 (before collapsing spectacularly in the playoffs), 8
Does that sound like a team making progress toward consistently being a quality contender for the Stanley Cup? In fact, during the midget Duo's tenure, the team was repeatedly criticized in the local media for failing to invest sufficiently in the talent needed to improve results ...
(And remember that as this decade has gone on, the old excuse that Canadian teams in the NHL are disadvantaged by the CAD-USD exchange rate – since they have most revenues in CAD, but many expenses (e.g. salaries and travel) in USD – has collapsed, as CAD has moved back to par with USD)
The best that could be said about the midget Duo is that he learned to make the right noises to the (often prickly, believe it or not ...!) francophone media and fans about respecting the club's traditions and history – sound familiar? – and that he sold up while the Habs were at least still solvent and in operation (with much credit for that being owed to the NHL CBA, no doubt ...).
To summarize: I might – might, but no more! – trust the midget Duo to own and operate a minor league outfit in some provincial backwater, where there was very limited scope to mess it seriously up ... but not more than that ...
04:19 AM EST