Call it a conspiracy theory, but Clemens may have played a delicate game to escape Houston.  Think of it as the Rocket in CGI (computer-generated imagery).  What you see is a Rocket launched toward retirement.  What you get is a team of smart individuals manipulating the perceived image.  Roger Clemens will not retire, but he will depart Houston.  Here is how he and his agents may have accomplished the task.

First, what would motivate Clemens to leave Houston?  To begin with, Clemens is a fierce competitor and Houston--Texas for that matter--is not a "baseball state."  When Clemens pitched, he would fill the stands, but the stadium lacked such a fan presence at other times.  It is akin to Randy Johnson in Arizona, prior to joining the Yankees.  Clemens has an opportunity to pitch for one of the two most stories franchises in history: the Boston Red Sox and the New York Yankees.  It is unfair to fault him for wishing to join a team in the spotlight.  Perhaps, at this stage of his career, he believes he requires such an atmosphere to feel a true adrenaline rush each game.

Further, Clemens has pitched 16 seasons, and the NL offered a fresh opportunity and new challenge after the 2003 season.  Since joining the NL, Clemens has posted ERAs of 2.98 and 1.87.  He has convincingly dominated the challenge and the opportunity has lost some of its luster.   He may desire the more challenging atmosphere of the AL, or, more specifically, the AL East.  It would test his ability to still retire some of the most potent offenses in baseball.

Clemens also needs to win next year and in the future, should he continue pitching past 2006.  Houston had a remarkable turnaround for the second consecutive year in 2005.  However, if the team finds itself in yet another hole in May or June of 2006, should Clemens anticipate a third reversal of fortune?  

The current construction of the 2006 Astros lacks reliable #3, #4, and #5 starters, and, while Preston Wilson was a savvy pickup, the offense will still struggle to score runs, particularly on the road.   Considering no team in the NL Central will defeat St. Louis is 2006, barring extraordinary luck (or poor luck for St. Louis), should Clemens hope Houston sneaks into the playoffs via the Wild Card again?  Boston and New York, on the other hand, are virtually perennial playoff contenders these days.  Clemens does not have time to pitch for "maybes," and his ties to Texas are probably not so strong as to prevent a change of venue.

Speaking of his ties, one reason Clemens wished to retire was to allow his ailing mother to see his Hall of Fame induction.  She passed away last year.  The addiction to baseball that convinced Clemens to return for 2005 despite his mother's worsening condition now has only the obstruction of his immediate family.  Clemens is in no rush to end his career anymore, and if his family permitted him to pitch in 2005, it will probably agree to do so in 2006 as well.  Whether it will allow him to do so outside of Texas is something only Clemens knows, but considering he did not immediately reject ventures by Boston, New York, or Texas, one might assume he has no geographic restrictions if--or when--he returns.

Personal issues aside, Clemens must consider his health.  While it would not motivate him to leave Houston, it certainly does not close the door.  He has pitched at least 180 innings per year over the past 10 seasons, an impressive feat.  His 2005 hamstring problems were not career-threatening, and an offseason of recuperation should send him into 2006 surgery- and pain-free.  More importantly, none of his injuries concerned his arm--such an injury would have provided sufficient reason to retire after 2005.  At this point, it is unlikely Clemens' health will be a major deterrent to his return.

In summary, Clemens is a talented pitcher who may wish to pitch in a more intense market, in the more challenging AL, and on a more competitive team.  His family obstacles are mild at best and his health is not a major concern.  What could he and his agents, the Hendricks brothers, do to spin his defection back to a team like Boston or New York?

The first problem was Clemens had to avoid an arbitration offer from Houston.  If Houston offered arbitration and Clemens accepted it, the Collective Bargaining Agreement would require he either play for Houston or retire in 2006.  If he rejected such arbitration and signed elsewhere, he would risk losing face in his home state of Texas, where he is revered.  Houston is capable of matching almost any offer, so departing for a similar or worse offer from another team would slap Houston fans, if not Texans, in the face by saying "this place is not good enough for me."

Team Clemens chose to act extremely undecided about the issue.  Consequently, Houston realized it could not afford to offer arbitration and wait two or three months for a decision.  The Houston budget is stretched thin with $16 million pinch-hitter Jeff Bagwell still an Astro.  If Clemens opted to retire in late January or early February, then Houston would have had money burning a hole in its pocket and all the free agents would have already found homes.  To place immediate focus on preparing the 2006 team, Houston refrained from offering arbitration with the lingering hope Clemens would return to pitch for Houston in May.  However, Clemens likely never had any intention of returning to Houston.

By stating Clemens required until January of February to decide and then not rashly signing with a team like Boston or New York, Team Clemens successfully created a picture of an innocent boy choosing between college aspirations or staying home to help his parents on the farm.  Someone who is that undecided cannot label a precise time period for when he will make his decision, but Clemens did.  Apparently, the stars would align in late January or early February.  Talking to his family and receiving its input would not require more than a week.  His competitiveness would not allow minor hamstring problems to end his career, and he intends to pitch in the World Baseball Classic.  Why the deadline, then?

Other than cementing that he truly is struggling with this decision, late January and early February represent a terrific financial period for both Clemens and his commission-hungry agents.  The longer one waits, the more desperate some teams become as the market shrivels from grape to raisin.  Scott Boras often waits as long as possible to guarantee the best monetary reward for his clients.  He did not place Kevin Millwood or Jarrod Washburn until mid-late December, and he continues to search for Jeff Weaver's next payday.  He was responsible for the same tactics with players like Ivan Rodriguez and Magglio Ordonez in past seasons.

Clemens could have easily signed at least a one-year, $18 million contract in early December, so money is not the overriding factor here.  Still, teams like Boston, New York, and Texas may open the coffers to the tune of $20-22 million later this month.  A few million is a still a few million, even to Roger Clemens.

The final major obstacle was conditioning.  Clemens could have continued his normal workout regimen, simply stating he was preparing in the off chance he would return.  He could have also deferred to merely staying in shape for his own well-being.  However, both would have raised red flags and created a lingering buzz that betrayed his "indecision."  Enter the World Baseball Classic.  Clemens agreed to pitch in the event, thus allowing him to stay in peak physical condition without drawing unwanted attention or skepticism to his true intentions for 2006.

That is my theory on Clemens' situation.  If true, it has been a wonderfully executed game of story-spinning and deception.  Perhaps it was Clemens' idea and the Hendircks brothers gave it life, or perhaps it was the other way around.  Clemens will likely pitch for the Yankees or Red Sox in 2006, with the only other possibility Texas.  Texas is an unlikely destination given the team's recent failures and the larger budgets of the AL East rivals.  If Clemens does find himself pitching home games at Ameriquest Field, then either his family had a larger impact on his decision than anticipated or Clemens wished to undertake another imposing challenge: pitching in Ameriquest Field.  Regardless, Clemens will wear a Major League logo next year--and it will not be on a polo shirt.

The 2005 NL West Division featured one of the weakest divisional races in recent Major Leauge history, with San Diego barely eclipsing the 0.500 mark.  It was so poor that even Colorado started winning regularly.  An offseason can change the divisional makeup in a hurry, and next year, the NL West will feature one of the better races in baseball.

Arizona Diamondbacks

For all the rising young talent in this organization, there certainly is a dearth of pitching.  Sure, there's Brandon Webb and, if he blossoms, Dustin Nippert, but then what?  Pitching is essential to winning and Arizona has little of it.  The NL eventually figured out Brad Halsey, and he is no better than a mediocre #5 starter at this point.  Miguel Batista is in decline and would only be an adequate #5 starter as well.  Russ Ortiz imploded last year, and he is signed through 2008 at an exorbitant salary.  The Diamondbacks may hope Orlando Hernandez stays healthy and confuses unfamiliar NL hitters en route to moderate success, but he will be no better than a #3 starter with his longball tendencies in the Arizona heat.  Claudio Vargas digressed after initially starting strong in Arizona last season.  Further, the pitching-starved Nationals traded him--a testament to his ceiling.  In short, the team has one #1 starter and likely a warehouse of #5 and #6 starters.

Meanwhile, the organization still has overpaid veterans Luis Gonzalez (signed through at least 2006) and Shawn Green (signed through 2008), and no team will trade any worthwhile prospects for either player unless Arizona absorbs most or all of either player's salary.  Russ Ortiz, another bad contract, could only be traded one-for-one in a bad contract swap. 

Nevertheless, this team has a wealth of young talent that only Tampa Bay would not envy.  With super-prospects Justin Upton, Stephen Drew, Carlos Quentin, and Conor Jackson, the future offense is promising.  Upton and Drew will eventually comprise the middle infield, while Quentin will play outfield and Jackson first base.  Chris Young, a good but less-talented prospect, has become one of the more overrated prospects in baseball this offseason--and that is one reason White Sox GM Ken Williams moved him when he did.  Williams, like fellow GMs John Schuerholz and Billy Beane, knows the abilities of every player and prospect in his system.  In fact, of the prospects he has traded since he took the reins in 2002, only Jeremy Reed has a guaranteed Major League contract next year.  Young brings good defense and a walk-to-strikeout ratio akin to that of Mike Cameron.  However, the current Mike Cameron may represent Young's ceiling, and Williams did not trade a future star.

As neighbor Texas has demonstrated, a first-place offense is still on a last-place team if there is no pitching.  Financial constraints prevented the Diamondbacks from pursuing pitching this offseason, and it may do so in the future as well.  Without such pitching, the Diamondbacks may outscore opponents to a winning record some seasons, but it will probably never capture the NL West title.  In 2006, it should finish in the middle of the pack in the division.

Colorado Rockies

The Colorado Rockies are the ultimate directionless team.  First, it tried to win with offense.  Then, it tried to sign sinkerball pitchers to absurdly large contracts.  Then, it tried drafting quality young pitching.  It reverted to drafting hitting before again pursuing young pitching.  Now, the team is almost entirely free of previously poor contracts and may be able to act in next year's free agent market.  However, for 2006, it is largely a collection of young players jockeying for starting roles.

The offense still revolves around Todd Helton, but talented young hitters like Clint Barmes, Garrett Atkins, Matt Holliday, and Brad Hawpe now complement Helton and combine to form a formidable offense.  The pitching, however, still lacks an ace or many reliable arms in general.  Jeff Francis is a very talented young lefty who may eventually excel in Colorado, but the pitchers behind him--Jason Jennings, Aaron Cook, Sunny Kim, and Zach Day --can only hope to keep the team’s offense within striking distance.  The bullpen is anchored by closer Brian Fuentes, who emerged as one of the league's top 9th inning options in 2005.  Still, maintaining a lead with the 6th, 7th, and 8th inning pitchers often proved troublesome.

There is reason to believe Colorado may sneak into fourth place this season, but it would require a partial meltdown by another team in the division.  The Rockies actually posted an impressive record after the All-Star Break in 2005, so there is reason for hope in Colorado. 

Los Angeles Dodgers

New GM Ned Colletti made a large splash when he stole Rafael Furcal from Chicago and Atlanta.  He followed that move by acquiring short-term veterans Nomar Garciaparra, Bill Mueller, and Kenny Lofton as well.  With infield prospects Andy LaRoche and Joel Guzman rising through the system, the team should be able to seamlessly transition from veteran to rising talent in 2007 or, at the latest, 2008.  In 2006, the infield, which will receive a boost when Cezar Izturis returns mid-season, is a proven core of veterans.  Moving Garciaparra to first base should minimize the strain on his groin, and if he does succumb to injury, the team has backups at the position.  In the outfield, the team is deep with J.D. Drew, Lofton, Jose Cruz, Jr., Jason Werth, Ricky Ledee, and Jason Repko.

The pitching staff largely resembles the 2005 staff, other than the addition of Brett Tomko and the subtraction of Jeff Weaver.  Brad Penny, Derek Lowe, and an injury-prone Odalis Perez head the staff, followed by Tomko at #4, where he belongs.  In the fifth slot, Los Angeles may open the competition to Edwin Jackson and prospect Chad Billingsley, or it may acquire a veteran arm for the position.  In the bullpen, Eric Gagne resumes the closer's role, bumping Yhency Brazoban and company back to setup duties.  As a whole, the pitching that has been a staple of the Dodgers for years will continue to support the team in 2006.

Los Angeles, with a balanced combination of pitching, defense, and hitting, is built to win in 2006 and the seasons that follow.

San Diego Padres

GM Kevin Towers dodged a bullet--a large, speeding bullet--when he snatched free agents Brian Giles and Trevor Hoffman from other suitors at the last possible moment.  He initially offered a modest, non-negotiable contract to each player, almost daring them to find more attractive deals.  To his surprise, each player found more attractive deals from several teams.  Towers finally met the asking price of each player, securing two of the cornerstones from the 2005 NL West Division Champion team for contracts at or below market value.

In addition, Towers deserves credit for the heist that brought Mike Cameron to San Diego for old and mediocre prospect Xavier Nady.  Cameron brings Gold-Glove defense to an expansive Petco Park outfield and has the ability to leadoff as well.  His primary concern involves his horrific crash with Carlos Beltran in right field last year, which left him with several broken bones in his face.  If fully recovered, he will be an impactful pickup for the Padres. 

However, Towers also traded second base stalwart Mark Loretta for backup catcher Doug Mirabelli in a perplexing trade that clearly weakened the team while only saving it a small sum of money.  In another deal, Towers sent Eaton, who is nearing free agency, to Texas for a younger, less talented Chris Young.  The dropoff should not be significant, if even existent, next season, but Eaton has the potential to be a #1 starter and may now realize it with another team.  Finally, the team acquired declining Vinny Castilla and signed defensively- and offensively-inclined Mark Bellhorn to complete a lackluster infield.

The San Diego pitching staff in 2006 promises to be worse than that of 2005 .  While Jake Peavy is still a legitimate #1 starter, Chris Young is best used as a #3 starter and Woody Williams has digressed to a #5 starter.  Chan #### Park is no longer capable of pitching in Major League games and Pedro Astacio, if he returns, is bound to regress.  The bullpen lost Akinori Otsuka and Chris Hammond, leaving only Scott Linebrink and Trevor Hoffman as reliable, veteran presences.

After claiming the NL West by default in 2005, San Diego does not possess enough pitching or hittting to challenge for the title in 2006.  It will likely place 3rd or 4th, and the future is just as promising unless it has more success acquiring or developing players.

San Francisco Giants

With Barry Bonds healthy last year, San Francisco likely would have captured the NL West title.  A healthy Bonds and a rotation with four quality pitchers in Jason Schmidt, Noah Lowry, Matt Morris, and Matt Cain may well make San Francisco the co-team to beat with Los Angeles in 2006.

However, the team is old--actually, it is intentionally old--in lieu of GM Brian Sabean's strategy, and it is one or two major injuries from mediocrity.  Moises Alou generally requires one trip per year to the disabled list, while Bonds' future remains uncertain and Ray Durham is day-to-day the entire season.  Omar Vizquel has shown little indication of decline and there are a handful of players closer to 30 than 40, but the long-term prospects of this team are grim.

The organization usually avoids the opportunity to draft players in the first-round of the amateur draft because of large signing bonuses, and the present result is a fairly barren farm system.  Matt Cain was one of the last fruits to be plucked, and it may be a long while after Bonds retires or moves to the AL that San Francisco is again a contender.  However, Bonds-willing, the team will contend in 2006.

Garland Receives Three-Year, $29 Million Deal

White Sox GM was not optimistic about the chances of signing Cy Young candidate Jon Garland earlier in December.  Consequently, he traded with Diamondbacks GM Josh Byrnes to send Garland a message: Pack your things, the White Sox organization does not submit to greed.  Garland apparently had discounted the several years of patience during which the White Sox endured year after year of mediocrity from Garland until he finally realized his potential.

Next to the term "league average pitcher" in a baseball encyclopedia is a photo of Jon Garland.  From 2002-2004, Garland went 36-36 with a 4.67 ERA with no brilliant years and no awful years.  The White Sox very easily could have parted ways in favor of one of the many young pitchers the organization has had throughout the years, but it kept faith in Garland.  Finally, six years after the White Sox stole him from the cross-town rival Chicago Cubs, Garland won 18 games with an impressive 3.50 ERA that was even lower most of the season.  Every start, observers waited for the wheels to come tumbling off the bus, sending it into an uncontrollable tailspin, but the wheels remained tightly fastened--and it had little to do with good luck.

                                               
                                                  
                                          

                                               
                                                  
   League average pitcher:  see above

A pitcher essentially controls three statistics: homeruns, walks, and strikeouts.  Luck is chiefly responsible for the rest.  Garland had allowed 1.37 homeruns per nine innings pitched between 2003 and 2004, the first seasons in the newly configured ballpark.  In 2005, he lowered that rate to only 1.06.  However, Garland's most noticeable improvement was his control.  After allowing 3.30 walks per nine innings between 2003 and 2004, he slashed the number to just 1.91 in 2005.  His strikeout rate remained constant and he should have allowed more hits, but his 2005 season was more talent-based than luck-based.

Entering the 2005 offseason, GM Ken Williams had an advantage most other teams envied: signed, quality starting pitching.  With Mark Buehrle and Freddy Garcia under contract through 2007, he had two guaranteed aces for the next two seasons.  When he traded for Javier Vazquez, he obtained another starter for the 2007 season.  In fact, the Collective Bargaining Agreement mandates that Vazquez is White Sox property for the next three seasons given his trade demand.  Three rotational fixtures for the next two years: Williams must have felt euphoria.  With rising talent Brandon McCarthy and his reworked motion now a reliable fifth starter for the next several seasons, Williams could shore up his 2007 rotation by the end of 2005 while other teams struggled to form a 2006 rotation.

The two options for the #4 slot in the rotation were Jon Garland and Jose Contreras.  When Garland dismissed his loyalties to the team and demanded a ransom for one season of excellence, Williams understandably balked.  He acquired Vazquez to make Garland expendable and proceeded to negotiations with Contreras.  Contreras, originally optimistic about a contract extension, felt the White Sox final offer to be undesirable.  The risk with Contreras is that he may not be only 33 years old--foreign players often use the names and birthdates of younger siblings to appear more attractive to Major League teams.  With Garland, the White Sox know his age, and his lengthy tenure in Chicago means the White Sox understand his make-up and background more than that of Contreras.  Contreras may presently possess more devastating "stuff" than Garland, but what is to say he does not turn into Orlando Hernandez in two years?

Garland made the White Sox decision academic by lowering his request.  He will still make a healthy $29 million over the next three seasons, but the length of the contract is reasonable, and he should at least be a quality #3 starter.  Considering the contracts Jaret Wright, Carl Pavano, and Matt Clement received from American League teams after they had pitched much of their careers in National League parks as well as several of the contracts signed this offseason, Garland was a smart signing.

The White Sox rotation in 2006 will consist of Buehrle, Garcia, Contreras, Garland, and Vazquez, with McCarthy in reserve.  In 2007, the White Sox may re-sign Contreras, but that could push the team over its budget.  Rather, it may elect to insert McCarthy into the vacancy.  True to his word, GM Ken Williams has constructed this team around pitching and defense while supplementing it with offense.  The Garland signing nearly completes a vigorous offseason that makes the White Sox the team to beat in the American League--if not in all of baseball.

Ask Willie Harris, and he will tell you he is every bit as talented as Brian Roberts, with whom he rose through Baltimore's farm system.  The White Sox, however, never valued him as a valuable commodity.  Rather than hand the second base job to Harris in 2005, the organization ventured as far as Japan to find a more attractive option.  Initially, Harris opposed returning to the White Sox in 2006, but his stance softened after his World Series experience.  Nevertheless, the White Sox non-tendered him this offseason, and surprisingly, only Colorado has displayed serious interest.

Harris, 27 on Opening Day, is a speedy center fielder, second baseman, and even shortstop with adequate on-base skills.  While a few teams, namely the Padres and Rockies, still need a second baseman, other teams could do much worse than Harris in center field or as a fourth outfielder.  Range factor, a measure of fielding ability derived from the number of plays made per game by a player, rates Willie Harris at 2.80 for his career in center field.  For some perspective, that would have tied for fifth among qualifying major league center fielders in 2005.

The biggest knock on Willie Harris is his inability to hit left-handed pitching.  However, to be fair, the White Sox never allowed Harris to improve against lefties, instead relegating him primarily to platoon and pinch-running duties.  As a capable leadoff hitter versus right-handed pitching, Harris would be a reliable half of a platoon situation, and a team could feasibly hit him ninth against lefties to keep his speed and defense in the game.  At the very least, teams would do well to acquire an inexpensive pinch-hitter, pinch-runner, and defensive replacement, granted Harris would accept such a role. 

A second, less significant complaint about Harris is his power deficiency.  However, he may still develop power to a smaller scale of Brian Roberts in 2005.  Further, the center field position does not mandate power as much as speed, defense, and batting average or on-base percentage.  As logical as it appears to pursue Harris, why, then, has there been so little interest in him with the free agent market so thin?

Three organizations--the Cubs, Yankees, and Red Sox--required one-year stop-gaps in center field; after all, Andruw Jones and Torii Hunter, among others, will be free agents next offseason.  Chicago traded a large portion of its young pitching surplus to acquire a one-year rental in Juan Pierre.  The Yankees signed 32-year-old Scott Boras client Johnny Damon to an exorbitant four-year, $52 million deal that is likely to disappoint.  Now, Boston seemingly must trade an Andy Marte or Bronson Arroyo to acquire the Jeremy Reeds and Joey Gathrights of the league.  Neither player is a one-year solution and both would detract from the team by costing prospects or pitching.  Those same prospects and pitchers have more value to the organization as bargaining chips for players like Julio Lugo, who would fill the shortstop void, and Danys Baez, who would provide insurance for Keith Foulke.

Meanwhile, a young, inexpensive, and capable Willie Harris may resort to joining the aimless Colorado Rockies.  He can provide similar production to Reed and Gathright at little cost to the team and, in an extreme scenario, may even blossom into a long-term solution.  The manner in which desperate organizations have approached center fielders this offseason is one abstract piece of art with eyes and noses scattered in a manner that defies reason.  Barring a change of heart by Boston, Harris will be yet another displaced facial structure.

Deep breaths, Boston Red Sox fans.  Several have prematurely pressed the "panic" button, but Boston is in no state of structural instability.  The new management team has performed well this offseason, and the 2006 team will again contend for the American League East title.

To begin this analysis, one must make some preliminary assumptions.  First, Manny Ramirez will stay in Boston.  With no other premier free agents to sign until the flush 2006 offseason class, Boston would need to receive a player like Tejada in return for Ramirez.  That will not happen because Baltimore wishes for Boston to attach young pitching to the deal--the same pitching that Boston has earmarked for other needs.  Ramirez will drop his trade request or, per the Collective Bargaining Agreement, forfeit $57 million.  Even a man with a mafia bounty on his head would stay in town for $57 million.

Second, Boston will acquire a centerfielder and possibly a shortstop via the trade route.  Andy Marte and Bronson Arroyo are two talented Red Sox trade chips, so at least one of the two players acquired by the Red Sox should be an above average regular.  That may mean a talented Julio Lugo and an unproven Joey Gathright, or it may mean a semi-talented Jeremy Reed and a stop-gap in Alex Gonzalez.  At worst, the organization figures to add at least one more quality regular and one black hole similar to Mark Bellhorn (yes, he walks, but he was cut  for a reason).  At best, the organization will acquire two above average regulars.

Those assumptions in tow, Boston also adds Mark Loretta, Mike Lowell, Andy Marte, Josh Beckett, Rudy Seanez, and Guillermo Mota, while it loses Edgar Renteria, Johnny Damon, Bill Mueller, Kevin Millar, Hanley Ramirez, Anibal Sanchez, Chad Bradford, Wade Miller, and a few lesser pitching prospects.  Loretta is a contact hitter with slightly above average speed who has posted a higher career on-base percentage than Johnny Damon.  Mike Lowell, despite his 2005 numbers, is a talented hitter with good power and plate discipline.  He only turns 32 next season and is a prime candidate to bounce back in 2006.  Beckett's profile has his home/road splits highlighted in three colors, but he is still a #1-type pitcher who should post a sub-4.00 ERA for the Red Sox.  Andy Marte is one of the top five prospects in baseball and a useful trading chip should Boston opt for that route.

Renteria had an abysmal 2005 season, and replacing his impact on the roster will not be overly difficult.  Damon is overrated defensively, and signing an aging centerfielder to an expensive, long-term contract is tempting fate.  Mueller is a contact hitter, but nothing special.  Kevin Millar is old, declining, and was booed more than some Yankees at Fenway Park.  Hanley Ramirez was not offensively ready to play for the Red Sox in 2006, but is still a potential perennial All-Star at shortstop.  He was, however, expendable with Dustin Pedroia, another middle infielder, on the rise.  Losing Anibal Sanchez is a significant hit to the Red Sox, but Beckett is more than fair compensation.  Chad Bradford is on the downside of his career, and Wade Miller is injured--no impactful losses there.  This summary should be ointment--the antibiotics are next.

For the sake of comparison, assume Boston acquires Lugo and Gathright from Tampa Bay to complete its lineup.  To compare the 2005 Red Sox that nearly won the American League East and occupied first or second place much of the season to the 2006 lineup, we will use the Win Shares system devised by Bill James, a Red Sox consultant, and modified by the Hardball Times.  Every three win shares equates to one win contributed to a team's total.  [Reader's note: If you wish to skip the win shares evaluation and math, move to the paragraph beginning "All things considered."]

The following is the 2005 Boston Red Sox roster of starters and platoon players, with some very minor role players excluded:

Manny Ramirez 34 win shares

David Ortiz 31

Johnny Damon 25

Jason Varitek 19

Bill Mueller 18

Tim Wakefield 16 

Trot Nixon 16

Edgar Renteria 14

Mike Timlin 13

David Wells 13

Matt Clement 12

Bronson Arroyo 12

Kevin Millar 10

John Olerud 7

Tony Graffanino 5

Doug Mirabelli 5

Mark Bellhorn 5

Jonathon Papelbon 4

Mike Myers 4

Wade Miller 4

Curt Schilling 4

Alex Cora 3

Kevin Youkilis 3

Chad Bradford 2

Keith Foulke 2

Total: 281 + 5 win shares from minor role players = 286 win shares

Expected win total: 286/3 = 95 games

Losing Damon (25 win shares) and Renteria (14) costs 13 wins.  Ouch.  However, adding Lugo (24) and Gathright (4) compensates for the losses.  Gathright's low total is reflective of his playing time more so than his actual ability.  Between his defensive and offensive contributions, he would net at least 11 win shares as a regular member of the Red Sox.  That would decrease the difference between 2005 and 2006 at center field and shortstop to four win shares, or roughly a single win.

Youkilis earned his three win shares in 44 games and 79 at-bats.  As he improves and plays a full season, he will easily out-earn Millar's 2005 mark of 10 win shares.  Simple math alone would dictate that three win shares in 79 at-bats translate to 21 win shares in 550 at-bats.  It would be fair to assume he would earn 15 win shares in 2006 if Boston made him a regular.

At second base, Mark Loretta fills a gaping hole from 2005.  In an injury-plagued off-year in 2005, he earned 15 win shares.  In 2004, he earned 33.  If he provides 20 in 2006, he will still add 15 to Bellhorn's 2005 total.  Mike Lowell earned 26 win shares in 2004 and just 9 in 2005.  A reasonable expectation for 2006 would be 15 win shares.  That is a dropoff of three win shares from the 2005 version of Bill Mueller, but Lowell could very easily out-earn Mueller.

Finally, it is difficult to read which bench players will provide what contributions.  The Red Sox may platoon a right-handed hitting first baseman with Youkilis--Petagine, if Boston ever offers him a prolonged opportunity, or J.T. Snow, if he selects Boston--or a right-handed hitting outfielder with Nixon, but neither is guaranteed.  The Red Sox bench has not been its strength under the current management, and for the sake of this argument, we may assume it will provide similar contributions to those in 2005.

All things considered, the Red Sox offense will not see a significant decline in 2006.  On-base assets Lugo and Loretta would bat first and second, followed by Ramirez and Ortiz, and then a combination of Varitek, Nixon, and Lowell.  Youkilis and Gathright could bat eight and ninth, although there is an argument to be made for each player to bat higher.

The pitching staff will probably lose Bronson Arroyo and David Wells, and I will account for each loss in the pitching analysis.  The Red Sox staff as whole underachieved in 2005, as only Tim Wakefield pleasantly surprised at times.  Arroyo (12 win shares) and Wells (13) contributed eight wins to the Red Sox in 2005.  Boston should fill the vacancies with Beckett and Papelbon, unless it signs another starter to keep Papelbon in the bullpen.  Beckett (14) and Papelbon (4) will prevent a large dropoff in the rotation.  Beckett will likely earn at least his 14 win shares again with the potential for significantly more, while Papelbon, whose win share total is tempered by throwing only 34 innings in 2005, will adequately replace a slipping Bronson Arroyo. 

Acquisitions aside, Curt Schilling enters 2006 healthier than he entered 2005.  At the very least, he should provide better than a 4.50 ERA.  Clement is still a reliable #3 starter and will have had a full offseason to recover from the line-drive off his head and the ensuing poor second half performance.  Ultimately, Boston only stands to receive a better performance from its starting rotation that it did in 2005.

The relief corps lost Bradford and Myers, but it acquired Mota, signed Seanez, and re-signed Timlin to set up Foulke.  In terms of win shares, a healthy Mota in 2004 added 11 in 2004 despite only two in 2005, and a healthy Seanez contributed seven in 2005.  If Foulke returns to form--a big "if"--Boston will have a strong bullpen.  If not, Timlin can assume closing duties with Mota and Seanez setting him up, or the team may acquire Danys Baez.

Okay, we have tossed around a lot of numbers.  What is the bottom line?  This 2006 Boston Red Sox team can be every bit as good as the 2005 Boston Red Sox team--and that is from a Chicago aficionado.  The offense, after its acquisitions, will have a similar output.  The starting pitching can only improve, and the same goes for the bullpen.  In two years or so, New York will have another aging center fielder, this time named Johnny Damon.  His current skill set will improve the Yankees in the short-term, although Fenway Park and the Red Sox clearly inflated his 2002-2005 statistics.  Boston (and Chicago) prefers to think of next season, not two seasons from now, but Boston will be one of the biggest suitors for both Andruw Jones and Torii Hunter next offseason, while New York's hands will essentially be tied.  If any center fielder deserves a long, lucrative deal and can actually earn it, it is a player like Jones.

Next year, the Yankees must trust a very suspect rotation of aging arms, barking elbows and knees, and unproven youth, while Boston uses a more able rotation with a young pitcher—Papelbon--more talented than Chien-Ming Wang and a pitcher in Schilling who, despite his injuries last season, does not have arm troubles and finished 2005 strong.  Other than the changes explained in this article, plus a few minor cosmetic changes, there is not much difference between the 2005 and 2006 Yankees-Red Sox feud.  In a 162-game season or a seven-game playoff, either team could prevail and neither team will embarrass itself.

An airport security guard once lectured me Logan International that there is no such thing as a casual Red Sox fan, so the team is all yours, folks.  However, if I hypothetically were a casual Red Sox fan, I would feel optimistic about my team's chances next season.

Sources: The Hardball Times, ESPN

Congratulations, BCS creators and advocates, your system actually worked this year.  You know what they say about a blind squirrel, though.  The time to revise the BCS to include a playoff system is at hand, and here is why:

1.  Other sports have experienced increased television ratings from incorporating playoffs.  The NFL, NBA, NHL, and MLB have all used playoffs for decades, but sports like tennis, NASCAR, and golf have only recently made the leap.  Tennis and NASCAR reported increased ratings, while golf will introduce its new playoff system in 2007.  Creating a 64-team playoff would be absurd because, unlike college basketball teams, college football teams require six days between games.  However, an eight-team playoff would more than suffice.  Rather than one or two games with high ratings, there would be seven.  What a way to bring in the New Year!

2.  Increased popularity for each game leads to better television contracts and more money generated per game.  The current slate of college football games produces an enormous amount of money, but a playoff bracket would further such revenues even more.  Rather than eliminating the rock-watching bowl games, a playoff system would merely complement them.

3.  A playoff bracket would add parity to the game and could potentially create "Cinderella stories," similar to March Madness.  A team that may have been deprived of an opportunity to demonstrate it was the best in the country--think Oregon, Penn State, and Notre Dame, among others--would could earn the right to play for the National Championship were a playoff system implemented.

4.  Adding a playoff system would not further infringe upon the education of student athletes.  By subtracting one game from the regular season and adding two games to the post-season, a three-round playoff bracket with eight teams would only add one more game to the college football schedule.  Most athletes are not in school from mid-December to early- or mid-January.  An eight-team playoff theoretically could run through the same time frame.  Another possibility is playing the first four games in early December, and the victorious four teams could then play on December 26th or 27th with the National Championship decided on January 2nd or 3rd.

5.  The BCS ranking system would still control who earned the eight spots in the tournament.  The BCS is not an utterly ineffective system and it continues to improve, but it does overlook some teams and overrate others.  Expanding the number of teams eligible to win the National Championship would greatly mitigate such a problem.  Given an eight-team playoff structure, the six BCS conference winners would still receive automatic bids and two at-large teams would receive bids as well.  There may still be complaints from the 9th and 10th best teams that barely missed the playoffs, but the deafening anticipation of the upcoming playoffs would mute it.  After all, at least there would be no outrageous snubs like USC in 2003-2004, and if there were five undefeated teams, such as was the case in 2004-2005, all would likely compete for the National Championship. 

Continuing to use the BCS would also allow for tangible standings; that is, in the final regular season game of the year, a team would understand what it must do to make the playoffs just as a team in mid-season would realize what it must accomplish to have a realistic chance of making the playoffs. 

One counter-argument that contradicts incorporating a playoff system is the use of players if the BCS has already guaranteed a team a playoff spot prior to the conclusion of the season.  Had Texas entered its final game against Colorado already guaranteed a playoff spot, would Vince Young have played as much as he did?  Perhaps, but probably only in light of Heisman Trophy implications.  It would be at the discretion of the head coach, but in many cases, the head coach will play the star player at least part of the game, particularly if it is at home, against a formidable opponent, or part of a rivalry.  Regardless, this argument alone only throws a delay of game flag compared to the personal fouls explained above.

The current BCS contract expires after the 2010 season.  At that time, college football fans may see the debut of a playoff system, although fluke seasons like 2005 hamper that possibility.  An eight-team bracket would be ideal, but a four-team bracket may be a more realistic first step.  Watching Texas and USC or Notre Dame and Ohio State will no doubt be a thrill these holidays.  But just imagine: Notre Dame rematches with USC, Texas battles Ohio State, and the deserving winners compete for the right to truly call themselves the National Champion.  Add Penn State, Oregon, Auburn, and Georgia to the fray, and linguists would spend the holidays inventing new words of a more extraordinary variety than the lyrics to Adam Sandler's Hannukah song.

Midway through the Bears-Falcons Sunday night game, Lovie Smith finally succumbed to the little red guy on his shoulder by inserting Rex Grossman.  The following several days, the sentiment around Chicago was almost universal: "Well, I never thought we were Superbowl contenders with Orton, but now, with Grossman, we're the team to beat in the NFC."  One could trust that "unbiased" view, but it would do more justice to take a deeper look into the Chicago Bears and its chances.

There is no single magic formula for winning the Superbowl, but recent history dictates the Bears have the components of one successful strategy: a strong defense and a devotion to running the football.  The ranks of the five Superbowl champions in rushing yards per game (RYPG) and points allowed per game (PAPG) during the regular season are as follows:

2000-2001: Baltimore Ravens

11th in RYPG, 4th in PAPG

2001-2002: New England Patriots

13th in RYPG, 6th in PAPG

2002-2003: Tampa Bay Buccaneers

27th in RYPG, 1st in PAPG

2003-2004: New England Patriots

27th in rushing, 1st in PAPG

2004-2005: New England Patriots

7th in rushing, 2nd in PAPG

The Patriots tended to complement the very good defense with a rushing game—even when it was weak in 2003-2004—and relied on Brady to do the rest.  Tampa Bay built around the defense and run as well, despite owning the 27th-rated rush attack, and asked a then-good Brad Johnson to fill in the gaps.  Even for a team with a mediocre rushing attack, it is important to establish the run game.  The rushing attack not only improves the passing game but also allows the team to dominate the time of possession.  That, in turn, rests the team’s defense, tires the opposing team’s defense, allows the offense to score, and prevents the opposing offense from taking the field.  Once the offense builds a lead, it forces the opposing offense to rely more on a pass-oriented offense—one reason Kerry Collins and Rich Gannon had to throw so many passes—and this even further sways the time of possession and prevents the defensive line from significant abuse.  The offense and defense are usually rested, whereas the opposing offense spends much of the game on the sideline and the opposing defense fatigues.

With this in mind, consider the Bears:

2005-2006: Chicago Bears

9th in RYPG, 1st in PAPG

Chicago’s fans have seen how awful Orton appears at times.  One reason for his late-season struggles was the better caliber of defenses faced, but he was also simply overthrowing, underthrowing, and poorly leading wide open receivers.  He was 9-4, and the town was grilling Lovie Smith to replace him, rather than toasting to Orton’s success.  That said, Grossman is certainly more talented now and has more potential for the future, but he is not Tom Brady or even Brad Johnson—not yet, at least.  Still, that does not preclude his team from winning Superbowl XL.  The two times in the past five seasons that a team has lacked a potent rushing attack, it had the top defense in the league and a good passing game to compensate.  Chicago lacks the good passing attack, but it still has the two most important keys: defense and rushing.  And the rushing attack will probably allow for at least adequate production in the passing game, which is 31st in the league as a result of Orton and the offensive scheme.

Certainly the most direct comparison to the 2005-2006 Bears is the 2000-2001 Baltimore Ravens.  It is eerie how well the teams compare.  Trent Dilfer was mediocre at best and played more to prevent the mistake than to make the big play.  That, coincidentally, is a crux of Lovie Smith’s passing game.  The team did, however, have a rushing game spearheaded by up-and-coming star Jamal Lewis.  Thomas Jones will conclude the regular season with almost an identical yards total and yards-per-carry average to those Lewis posted in 2000-2001.  Then, there was the other Lewis at middle linebacker leading the top-rated defense in the league.  Brian Urlacher fits the same mold, leading a talented defense to the lowest PAPG in the league.  If nothing else, the Baltimore Ravens confirm that a team can win without a threatening pass attack.

Statistics aside, Chicago, like the aforementioned teams, is extremely team-oriented: if one player on the team has a poor game, it does not preclude the team from winning the game.  In a pressure-filled atmosphere such as the Superbowl, where some players thrive and others choke, a team that invests heavily in one or two players carries significantly more risk than a team invested in the entire active roster.  Further, Lovie Smith may not have Bill Belichick’s mind, but he is still a well-prepared head coach who frequently experiences success with his strategies.

Chicago has satisfied a formula that promotes success, and thus far, it has produced an 11-4 record—far beyond the expectations of the savviest football expert or even Lovie Smith himself.  On February 5th, 2006, it is entirely possible that Chicago will face New England or Indianapolis in Superbowl XL in a fitting climax to Chicago’s season.  In fact, if the early lines are any indication, only the Seattle Seahawks are more likely to win the NFC.  What a year it would be for Chicago sports to bring two championships to a city only graced by the Bulls since 1985.

A team normally can win with a good general manager and bad luck, but even the luckiest teams cannot sustain prolonged success under poor management.  This commentary will identify and describe the 10 best general managers in baseball today.  Several themes frequently arise throughout the list—longevity of employment and success, a strong supporting management structure, respect for all members of the organization, knowledge of every player in the general manager’s organization and several in other organizations as well, and a firm grasp on the player market are a few examples.  In contrast, each general manager situation and approach is unique in its own sense, from Billy Beane’s moneyball and extreme statistical analyses to Brian Sabean’s “old guys” strategy.  

The list excludes new general managers, such as Jon Daniels of Texas, Ned Coletti of the Dodgers, Josh Byrnes of Arizona, co-general general manager Andrew Friedman of Tampa Bay, and the general manager tandem in Boston.  Track record is important, and regardless of what new general managers may have done this offseason or last, there has not been adequate time to evaluate them.  Former general managers, such as Theo Epstein, Ed Wade, and Paul DePodesta, are ineligible as well.  The years of employment, win-loss record, titles won, and average payroll only pertain to time spent by the general manager on his current team.  Years in which the general manager served as a consultant or assistant to his current team without being the general manager are excluded as well.

#1.  John Schuerholz, Atlanta Braves

1990-present; 1496-1028 (0.593); 15 consecutive NL East (West for pre-1994 seasons) titles, five NL championships, one World Series championship; no Sporting News Executive of the Year awards

2002-2005 Average Payroll (rounded to the nearest million): $94 million

1998-2001 Average Payroll: $77 million

1994-1997 Average Payroll: $46 million

1990-1993 Average Payroll: $26 million

The probability of the Hall of Fame honoring Schuerholz is no less than that of it presenting the same honor to Cal Ripken.  Nevermind that The Sporting News has yet to declare him the best general manager for any given year (he is frequently among the top four in voting for Executive of the Year but has never won). Schuerholz first embraced the Atlanta Braves franchise in 1990.  The franchise had posted a 324-480 (0.402) record over the previous five seasons and had not placed first in its division since 1982.  Atlanta lost more than it won in 1990, but it has not posted a losing season in the 15 seasons since.

Schuerholz constructed an empire based on trust, respect, ability, and character--in other words, a bunch of characteristics that many talk about but most neglect.  He surrounded himself with talent at the top, starting with the managers, scouting personnel, and player development instructors.  Leo Mazzone may have received the credit for the success of Atlanta pitchers, but Atlanta will easily survive without him.  Scouts discovered the pitchers, minor league development instructors taught the pitchers, Bobby Cox nurtured the pitchers, and now Jack McDowell, Mazzone's replacement, will be yet another competent piece of the growth puzzle.

The amazing aspect of Atlanta during Schuerholz's tenure is his uncanny ability to adapt.  For several years, it rode the arms of John Smoltz, Tom Glavine, Greg Maddux, Kevin Millwood, and even Steve Avery, while the bats of the blossoming Jones boys emerged.  When contracts expired and Atlanta lost the flowing funds from Ted Turner, some predicted a collapse.  Glavine and Maddux, past their respective primes, eventually would depart.  Undaunted, Schuerholz signed and traded to build around a nucleus of talent.  He and his advisors knew the players in Atlanta's system so well that the team seemingly never traded a future impact player, but it always filled its own needs regardless and remained within budgetary constraints.

#2.  Billy Beane, Oakland Athletics

1998-present; 732-563 (0.565); three AL West titles, one Wild Card; no Sporting News Executive of the Year awards

2002-2005 Average Payroll: $51 million

1998-2001 Average Payroll: $28 million

Warts.  Billy Beane actively scavengers for warts.  He lacks ample finances and his stadium is a mess, but if he can find the warts he desires and apply them to a well-devised strategy, he will be a perennial contender.  What are warts?  Frank Thomas and Mike Piazza are warts this year.  Scott Hatteberg and Chad Bradford were warts several years ago.  A wart is a player who the other teams do not want for some reason or another--injuries, age, body composition, arm strength, power, and recent ineffectiveness, to name a few--but players that are still valuable despite their shortcomings.  To provide some background, Billy Beane was an extremely talented, toolsy first-round draft pick of the New York Mets in 1980.  He had a bright future in baseball, but never had the mentality to reach it.  The experience taught him that tools and raw talent may look golden on paper, but they do not automatically translate into success.

As most know by now from Michael Lewis' book, Billy Beane implements a "moneyball" approach in which outs are the enemy and OBP and SLG are the keys to success.  Players with high SLGs rarely sell below market value, but Beane could hoard warts with high OBPs and acceptable SLGs for below market value.  When he demonstrated repeated success with this approach in trades, free agent signings, and amateur drafts, several other organizations took note.  Rather than pay more to stubbornly continue acquiring players with high OBP and SLG abilities, Beane unpredictably adapted.  While OBP, power, strong strikezone judgment, and quick, accurate pitch identification are good indicators of both present and future success, Beane came to a realization.  As the rest of the market shifted to what he formerly pursued, another sector of the market was becoming vastly undervalued.  Defense had been overvalued in the preceding years, but it gradually lost its zest in the growing offensive age.  Beane seized that market to field one of the best defensive teams in baseball.

In addition to understanding the precise statistical impact of nearly every baseball event in order to determine the value of a player, Beane drafts well.  Moneyball highlights the Oakland draft of 2002 in which Beane abandoned conventional scouting principles and established a new philosophy that continues to gain prominence today.  He did not want head cases, he did not want high schoolers, and he did not want to hear about the player with "the good face."  He did not want toolsy players unless statistics demonstrated that such tools would lead to success.  He and assistant Paul DePodesta discovered a correlation between plate discipline in college players and success in the majors, so they pursued certain players accordingly.  The technique was not foolproof, but it did net players like Mark Teahen and Nick Swisher.  Interestingly, four impact players--Bobby Crosby, Dan Johnson, Jeremy Bonderman, and Neal Cotts--were each drafted in the year prior to the change in approach.  The outcome of strong drafting has been an annual replenishment of talent when stars such as Giambi and Tejada leave via free agency, even if, as Beane puts it, “My #### doesn’t work in the playoffs.”

 #3.  Walt Jocketty, St. Louis Cardinals

1995-present; 956-806 (0.543); five NL Central titles, one Wild Card, one NL championship; Sporting News Executive of the Year, 2000 and 2004

2002-2005 Average Payroll: $103 million

1998-2001 Average Payroll: $61 million

1995-1997 Average Payroll: $38 million

John Schuerholz exemplifies how one runs a first-class operation, but Walt Jocketty may run the Cardinals in that fashion more so than even the Braves.  Players realize where they stand and where the team is heading.  They feel valued and respected by management, not like pawns on a chessboard.  As a result, Cardinals players have been known to sign at below market value to remain in St. Louis--coincidentally, the same holds true for Atlanta.  Jocketty also maintains tremendous relationships within the organization.  Unlike Beane, who can dominate, Jocketty resembles Schuerholz in his relationship with management--particularly manager Tony LaRussa.

Jocketty, as with most general managers listed here, has a very keen sense of the player market.  When it comes to constructing his team, he is a star-chaser, but not in a Yankee-esque way.  He prefers the established, "been there, done that" talent of a Mark Mulder over the "maybe if the stars align" talent of a Danny Haren or Daric Barton.  He has lost a few talents--Coco Crisp, Adam Kennedy, and J.D. Drew, to name a few--but for the most part has retained the vital minor leaguers, the potential stars.  Albert Pujols is one of the very few Cardinals to actually have emerged from the womb of the St. Louis farm system.  Next year, starting pitcher Anthony Reyes should be another, but, in general, Jocketty allows talent to develop elsewhere and then brings it to St. Louis.  Jocketty, unlike the Yankees, is not a big player in the free agent market.  For example, review his 2004 free agent signings: Reggie Sanders, Jeff Suppan, and Julian Tavarez.  This offseason, he has netted Braden Looper and Juan Encarnacion for the next three seasons.  Still, there is no reason to panic.

Jocketty is a rabid trade mastermind.  He will do it any day, any time, any place.  He victimizes teams for talent it does not realize it has or wants to unload for some reason, and then he signs those players to long-term deals.  Two-thirds of the power triumvirate in St. Louis--Scott Rolen and Jim Edmonds--was pilfered via trades.  Rolen had personal conflicts in Philadelphia, while Edmonds' injuries reduced his value in then-Anaheim.  Both were ripe for the picking, and Jocketty took the initiative.  Larry Walker was old and his numbers were supposedly inflated in Colorado.  Jason Marquis did not agree with Leo Mazzone, so Atlanta traded him (granted, it did receive one heck of a season from J.D. Drew in return).  Most teams mentioned on the list have been relatively quiet on the free agent front this offseason, and it is with very good reason: this market stinks and buying into it is bad for the future of the business and the team.  Trades and January bargains are where to make improvements this offseason, and we will hear from Jocketty before Opening Day—either with an economical signing akin to the Sanders and Suppan deals or via trades to plug the corner outfield and bullpen holes.

#4.  Brian Sabean, San Francisco Giants

1997-present; 812-645 (0.557); three NL West titles, one Wild Card, one NL championship; Sporting News Executive of the Year, 2003

2002-2005 Average Payroll: $83 million

1998-2001 Average Payroll: $67 million

1997 Payroll: $33 million

For reference, I was born after most players on the Giants took their first AAA-ball swings.  One looks at the previous three GMs and their organizations, and then one looks at Sabean's Giants.  Atlanta, Oakland, and St. Louis develop players to different extents, but they do develop players.  The remainder of the rosters may consist of players acquired through trade or free agency, but even then most of the star position players are on the right side of 35, if there is such a thing.  Sabean employs a strategy no has or likely ever will again: he signs old guys to long-term contracts.  Somehow, some way, the “old guys” strategy works very well.  A healthy Barry Bonds would have translated to another division title, albeit an unimpressive one, in 2005.

Here is the logic.  The price of a free agent in his mid-late 30s is considerably lower than that of a player in his 20s or early 30s.  Some players may earn large amounts of money in their late-30s, but usually that is a result of an ill-advised contract a team tendered to the player in his early-mid 30s.  A free agent like Reggie Sanders or Moises Alou--both players who have demonstrated an ability to maintain their respective skill sets despite nearing 40—will cost far less than an equally capable younger player who one expects to play longer, be more durable, and possibly improve.  Now, Sabean does not throw money at old players without ensuring health and ability.  He identifies older players capable of performing well at reduced costs and signs them.  The ####-for-buck is generally favorable, and if a player fades, Sabean did not pay him much in the first place.  It is a low-risk, high-reward practice, and it resembles Beane’s “warts” strategy, only Sabean focuses almost exclusively on the “age wart.”  On the other hand, signing old players--or any player, for that matter--with the objective of conceding future draft picks is downright ridiculous.  The Giants do not wish to pay the exorbitant signing bonuses of first round draft picks, but the team's farm system is as weak as or weaker than that of St. Louis--and that is really saying something.

There is another prominent component to Sabean's strategy--you guessed it, he is a trade wizard.  When Pittsburgh requested an arm, two legs, and a kidney for Kris Benson last year, it was with the July, 2000 Jason Schmidt heist in mind.  At that time, Sabean traded Armando Rios and Ryan Vogelsong for a struggling Jason Schmidt.  A year earlier, Sabean had traded for Livan Hernandez, while only surrendering Jason Grilli and Nate Bump to the Marlins.  Two years prior to that trade, Sabean received Robb Nenn for three never-to-emerge prospects.  Finally, in the offseason of 1996, he dealt popular third baseman Matt Williams for a slew of prospects, two of which were the young and cheap Jeff Kent and Julian Tavarez.  With a bare cupboard in the Minors, it is difficult to envision Sabean working trades any more significant than the Edgardo Alfonso-for-Steve Finley trade he manufactured last week.  That trade may well turn out brilliantly for San Francisco, but acquiring the Schmidts, Hernandezes, and Kents of the world is a difficult trick to turn with no prospects or MLB players of significant trade value.

#5.  Terry Ryan, Minnesota Twins

1994-present; 901-973 (0.481); three AL Central titles; Sporting News Executive of the Year, 2002

2002-2005 Average Payroll: $51 million

1998-2001 Average Payroll: $21 million

1994-1997 Average Payroll: $25 million

Quietly and with little fanfare or praise, a humble Terry Ryan has established himself as one of the best GMs in baseball for several years.  He invests heavily in the farm system--scouts, players, and player development personnel--and continually grows new talent to replace the departed old.  Unlike Atlanta, St. Louis, or San Francisco, Ryan lacks the financial power to make blockbuster trades or sign high-end free agents, but he does use every other resource at his disposal to compensate.  Ryan supplements drafted youth by packaging expendable prospects and Major League talent nearing free agency in bold trades, such as those that netted Johan Santana, Joe Nathan, Francisco Liriano, David Ortiz, Kyle Lohse, Lew Ford, Eric Milton, Jason Bartlett, and Joe Mays.  He experienced growing pains early in his career by failing to draft and acquire a solid nucleus of prospects that could sustain a low-budget team, but he has now emerged as one of the best in the game at that practice.

Since 2000, the Twins' payrolls have been $16 million, $27 million, $41 million, $55 million, $54 million, and $56 million.  It is a cycle where as the young talent grows, so do arbitration costs and contracts that buy out arbitration-eligible or free agent years.  After establishing the cycle, there should constantly be an influx of new young talent, an exodus of free agent talent, and several players in between receiving increased salaries with each new season.  Consequently, the budget should remain relatively stable, as it has for the Twins since 2003. 

One might have expected the Twins to start slowly at the turn of the millennium and gradually improve to the point of winning a division title by 2004, but instead, the Twins were so talented--and the division was weak enough--that it claimed first place from 2002 through 2004.  Jacque Jones has departed, and Torii Hunter may find himself on another team in August if Cleveland and Chicago quickly distance themselves from Minnesota in the 2006 standings. Shannon Stewart will complete the final year of a three-year, $18 million deal next season, and the team may part ways given its young outfield depth and the salary an aging Stewart may command.  With Radke likely to retire when his contract expires after the 2006 season and Joe Mays' exorbitant salary no longer an issue, the Twins may soon see a blip in the cycle, where the team payroll falls into the $40-45 million range for a season or two.  Ryan could add a mid-level free agent if he so desired, as he did with Shannon Stewart in 2003, or he could stay the course with his young talent. 

Regardless, 2007 will still see a very competitive team on Opening Day.  Justin Morneau, Joe Mauer, Jason Kubel, Jason Bartlett, and Alex Romero will form the position player foundation, while Santana, Liriano, Scott Baker, and other young arms will form at least an average rotation.  Nathan will anchor the bullpen with support from names like Jesse Crain and Juan Rincon.   While Ryan has not been perfect—he non-tendered little-known David Ortiz at one point—he has identified and admirably executed a strategy that allows him to operate independently of a free agent market that can rapidly deplete financial resources.  And in the process of implementing that strategy, he has brought three division titles in the past four seasons to a team with a significant financial handicap.

#6.  Doug Melvin, Milwaukee Brewers

2003-present; 216-269 (0.445)

2003-2005 Average Payroll: $36 million

The Brewers are no longer the punching bag of the National League, and Doug Melvin is chiefly responsible.  Another example of a team building from within, Milwaukee has not only stockpiled young talent but has made terrific acquisitions as well.  Melvin, familiar with Doug Davis and Danny Kolb from his days as the Rangers general manager, signed both as free agents.  Davis has become a reliable #2 starter, while Kolb assumed closing duties for part of 2003 and 2004.  Kolb then brought touted pitching prospect Jose Capellan to Milwaukee in a trade with Atlanta.  As a below average team with a corresponding high waiver rank, Melvin also plucked Derrick Turnbow off waivers from Anaheim and Brady Clark off waivers from the New York Mets. 

Meanwhile, the Brewers had drafted and developed extremely well, bringing J.J. Hardy, Rickie Weeks, and Prince Fielder to Major-League readiness.  Only Rickie Weeks was drafted during Melvin’s tenure, but Melvin encouraged the development of all young Brewers and did not block their ascension to the Majors with overpaid, long-term veterans.  Melvin further improved his team by trading overrated Scott Podsednik for a legitimate 30-HR threat in Carlos Lee last offseason.  He continued improving via trades by dealing Lyle Overbay for David Bush this offseason.  Melvin has assembled a rotation headed by Ben Sheets, Davis, Chris Capuano, and Bush, and a lineup potent enough to provide adequate run support.  As a whole, the team has a low budget, more talent rising through its farm system, and realistic chances of competing in the National League Central next season.

#7.  Mark Shapiro

2002-present; 315-333 (0.486); Sporting News Executive of the Year, 2005

2002-2005 Average Payroll: $51 million

It seems as if Cleveland always has more talent in its farm system than its 40-man roster can protect.  While Shapiro does favor building from within, he also inherited a fair base of talented prospects.  Cleveland, after an impressive seven-year run from 1995-2001 that saw the team win six division titles and place second in the other season, would witness the departures of Roberto Alomar, Kenny Lofton, and Juan Gonzalez after the 2001 season, Jim Thome after the 2002 season, and Omar Vizquel after the 2004 season.  Meanwhile, Victor Martinez, Jhonny Peralta, Brandon Phillips, Milton Bradley, Ben Broussard, and John McDonald awaited their turns. 

Shapiro’s task was daunting: he needed to maintain a winning tradition as marquis free agents departed and a core of young, unproven talents emerged—and he had to dramatically cut payroll in the process.  Shapiro exceeded expectations.  The team only endured two mediocre seasons in 2002 and 2003 before reestablishing itself as a contender.  Shapiro proactively added Travis Hafner, Grady Sizemore, and Coco Crisp for Ricardo Rodriguez, part of a season from Bartolo Colon, and an aging Chuck Finley.  Martinez, Crisp, Peralta, Hafner, and Sizemore became above average regulars—a testament to the Cleveland development system and scouting department.  Shapiro continued toward his goal of building around the young talent, supplementing with players such as Ron Belliard and Kevin Millwood and even earning the 2005 Executive of the Year