A lot of people in the national media are making Johnny Damon’s move to the Yankees into a larger-than-life event. It shifts the balance of power in the American League, the pundits say, and that may very well be true. The lineup that Joe Torre will pencil in on Opening Day 2006 will probably be the most well-rounded lineup since the last work stoppage in 1994.        

But what the media lacks more and more in this age of instant information is the ability to look beyond tomorrow. Sure, Damon to the Yanks is a coup for the clean-shaven men in pinstripes this season, but what will it look like in 2008 or 2009, when Damon is 35 and making $13 million?

The most common comparison for Damon is Bernie Williams, and while some will write off the latter’s decline to injuries, age has also surely played an important role. The similarities between Damon and Williams are intriguing: in 1999 and 2000, when Bernie Baseball was in his 30- and 31-year old seasons, he averaged 155 games played, 183 hits, 32 doubles, 28 home runs, and 11 stolen bases. His batting average over those two seasons comes to about .330, and his slugging percentage was about .545. (Statistics like RBI are more reflective of a player’s role on his team, so the more significant differences between Williams’ and Damon’s statistics in those seasons is not as relevant to the comparison.)

Damon just turned 32 at the beginning of November, so his 30- and 31-year old seasons were 2004 and 2005. In those years, Damon averaged 149 games played, 194 hits, 35 doubles, 15 home runs and 19 stolen bases. He hit about .308 over those two years and slugged slightly north of .450.

I have not just cherry-picked statistics, either. If you look at Damon’s and Williams’ numbers across the board, in those two seasons, the only major differences come in home runs, RBIs and slugging percentage, in which categories Williams had the advantage. It is even fair to say that their defensive strengths (range) and weaknesses (arm strength) are very similar.

Why is it not reasonable, then, to anticipate that Damon’s decline will likely mirror Williams’? If anything, in their example seasons, Williams was the better player! And yet by 2003 and 2004, when Bernie was the same age Damon will be in the last two years of his recently-signed contract, Williams was hitting .262 with a slugging percentage more than 100 points lower than during his peak seasons.

The moral of the story is that, yes, the Yankees have gotten themselves a fantastic player for 2006 and, likely, 2007 as well. Damon’s performance over the next two seasons is not, however, the reason the Red Sox were unwilling to pony up the big bucks. While people rightly say that the Red Sox are still on a different salary structure than most of Major League Baseball, it is false to assume that there are only two tiers. The Yankees form a level all to themselves, where they can absorb $15 million mistakes like the Royals absorbed 9^th-inning losses in 2005.

It is still imperative that the Red Sox be more fiscally responsible than the Yankees. Letting Damon go to the Bronx in 2006 allows the Sox to make a trade for a player who in 2008 and 2009 will be closer to his peak years than his decline years, something that can not be said about Johnny Jesus. The “gaffe” that Sox co-GMs Hoyer and Cherington committed when they allowed Damon to go to the Yankees might not win the division for the boys from Beantown in 2006, but it could very well do that in 2008 and 2009.