Near the end of July, the Washington Nationals decided to give shortstop Cristian Guzman a two-year, $16-million contract extension. Guzman, an All-Star, was having a fairly decent season at the time, hitting around .300 while ranking among league leaders in base hits. He is also a strong defender who can play multiple positions. Still, I was critical of the decision at the time, writing:

The Washington Nationals locked up shortstop Cristian Guzman to a two-year, $16 million extension earlier this week. Guzman was elected to the All-Star game, even making some nifty plays in the infield to help keep the National League in the classic extra-innings affair. In reality, however, Guzman did not deserve to be there, by any stretch of the imagination. Sure, he is batting .305 right now, is a solid defensive middle infielder and is finally healthy. Considering his injury-riddled tenure in DC--he missed the entire '06 season--that is saying a lot.

With that being said, Guzman's offensive output still leaves a lot to be desired, evident by his career line of .267/.305/.382 and .686 OPS. While he is actually hitting well above his weight for once, the 30-year-old shortstop has poor plate discipline, drawing walks about as frequently as Jason Bartlett of the Tampa Bay Rays, and is responsible for making far too many outs. Thus, when his batting average regresses back to the mean, his OBP will works its way back to an unacceptable level.

Well, the outmaking machine is now batting .294/.324/.400, for a whopping .725 OPS, through 110 games. Really, defense-aside, he is a below-average major league player. But the real problem that I had with Nationals general manager Jim Bowden’s decision is this: why throw money at a player—even an impact star—who will almost certainly not play an important role when Washington is finally ready to contend? Instead of accomplishing thing of real importance, deals like this usually set a club back from truly remaining competitive over an extended time period.

Over the length of deal, it seems, the Nationals will not be playing any meaningful games. True, anything can happen in the lowly National League. However, the odds of them making a real impact in the NL East before the turn of the next decade—especially with Bowden running the show—are fairly low.

So, I concluded the article like this:

With Guzman, it is almost certain that he will not be part of a postseason-caliber team during the length of the deal as the Nationals appear to be destined to remain in the cellar of the National League East. Therefore, by signing him, the organization took a step backwards, not forward, wasting financial resources that could be invested more wisely. He is only a band-aid, a short-term fix that will end up poorly for Washington. And by locking him up, Bowden essentially wasted millions of dollars that could be devoted to international scouting or signing draft picks.

Well, now it looks like the Nationals are not going to sign their first-round pick, Missouri starting pitcher Aaron Crow. Crow, the ninth pick of the draft, signed a professional contract to play Independent Ball with the Fort Worth Cats of the American Association on Wednesday.

According to Randy Hendricks, Crow’s agent, the talks between the two parties have stalled.

“We wouldn’t have had him sign with the Cats if we thought he was going to sign with the Nationals,” Hendricks said. “The last I talked with Jim Bowden, he didn’t think there was anything more to talk about. I didn’t disagree.”

There is still a chance that the two sides will reach an agreement before the deadline on Friday. It is likely, though, that he will become the next Luke Hochevar, who followed the same route after being selected in the 2005 draft by the Los Angeles Dodgers. Hochevar then reentered the draft the next June, and the Kansas City Royals took him with the number one overall pick.

Bowden—step in here, Stan Katsen—cannot let this happen. Although the organization will receive another first-round pick if they fail to sign Crow, they need to add another premier prospect to the farm system. Right Now.

As a mid-market team, they need to build from within, investing the proper money into player development, then locking up their young talent long-term—before free agency is even an issue. This is perhaps the only way that the franchise will ever be able to sustain a consistent level of success, given the economic market in the industry today. There is a high level of risk associated with nearly every pitcher who gets drafted, but failing to sign a first-round pick is inconsistent with the aforementioned vision.

Which is why the Guzman deal was puzzling, to say the least. Teams that throw around money at free agents when they are not ready to compete yet may leave fans—trust me, I received a lot of emails about why the Guzman deal was a smart move—with the perception that they are righting the ship. In reality, however, they are only prolonging the losing process.

Unlike the Nats’ incumbent shortstop, though, Crow has a chance to be a part of the truly next great Washington team, possibly at the top of the starting rotation. The 22-year-old right-hander has excellent stuff—highlighted by a mid-90s fastball, an 87 MPH power slider and decent command—and the chance to turn into a front-end starter in the majors. The Big 12 pitcher of the year, he went 13-0 with a 2.35 ERA and 127 strikeouts in 107 1/2 innings this past season.

Thus, Bowden has to do work out a deal. If he cannot do so, then you can add this to a list of many blunders during his tenure as GM. Heck, if he did not decide to waste all that money on Guzman, perhaps the dollar amount would not be an issue. Spending money on a potential star in the future is a much better investment than giving away charity to an aging middle infielder without any on-base skills and declining speed, right?

While the Bowden era may be coming to an end soon, the Nationals need to sign Crow. If money is the ultimate factor that prevents it from happening, especially after the Guzman debacle, a leadership change is an absolute must.

Unless, of course, the ownership group enjoys losing.