Bud Fiddles While Baseball Burns

Part One: Expansion, Contraction, Relocation and Depression

When Kirby Puckett died earlier this year, it reminded me of everything that baseball used to be just a decade or two ago. Puckett was the undersized, overweight hero of two Twins’ World Series wins. When Puckett stole a home run from over the fence, America cheered for the little guy. The Twins’ home Minneapolis-St. Paul was an undersized, too-cold metropolitan area that twice claimed the championship of the world in the late eighties and early nineties.

Just as Frank DeFord lacerated Puckett’s image in Sports Illustrated in the years since, Bud Selig has sliced and diced Baseball and it’s competitive tradition like Zorro. Selig’s legacy will be one of mismanagement and incompetence. I suggest that legacy should start immediately.

 

The Strike

        Selig was installed as acting commissioner in 1992. It didn’t take long until he helped inflict a gaping wound to Major League Baseball. The strike of 1994 cancelled the last half of the season and the World Series.

Canceling a World Series is always horrible. But canceling one for no reason is worse. MLB was unable to institute a salary cap or meaningful revenue sharing in its showdown with the players. Instead, when play resumed in 1995, the collective bargaining agreement was largely the same. Baseball could have reached the same agreement without a day of striking or lost revenue.

Football and Basketball both had struggled with labor strife but neither had missed a championship. Imagine if you had season tickets in 1994 and you paid for and sat through 100 games only to have no playoffs, no World Series and no champion. In the wake of the strike, Bud Selig would try to restore faith in America’s Pastime. Instead, Baseball’s credibility was just beginning to be damaged.

 

Haves and Have Nots

        After the ’94 strike, Major League Baseball was in a no better position to address issues of competitive inequity than before the strike. The big-budget Yankees would begin a reign of dominance, leading to a run of four championships in five years to close the decade. Meanwhile, talent was bleeding from “small-market” teams like the Kansas City Royals. This kind of imbalance is nothing new to baseball. The Kansas City Athletics shipped Roger Maris to the Yanks prior to his two MVPs and 1961’s 61 home runs and World Series championship.

        In the old days, if there were problems staying competitive in your city you could always move. There wasn’t the 33-year gap in franchise relocation that Selig oversaw the last half of. Also there were only 18 Major League franchises. So the Kansas City A’s took off for Oakland in ’68 and four years later Reggie Jackson and co. won 3 straight World Series. Kansas City was awarded the expansion Royals in 1969.

        As Bud’s era crept forward, players and teams realized that parity, a sporting concept Pete Rozelle and the NFL made famous, was going to be impossible to achieve with no salary cap and limited revenue sharing. The Union and the courts had long ago caught on to Baseball’s previous “salary cap”: collusion. Since then it has been every team for itself. It only took one gigantic contract for most franchises to hit the panic button: ARod’s.

        Alex Rodriguez’s 2000 contract with the Texas Rangers blew all other sports contracts out of the water. His $252 million 10-year deal was a record at the time. In comparison, the Royals franchise sold that same year for $96 million. Despite MVP-caliber production, Rodriguez’s contract turned into an anchor for even the large-market Rangers. ARod, as you know, headed for the super-rich Yankees.

        Johnny Damon and Carlos Beltrán are just two of the Royals’ ex-players who also eventually made their way to New York. Relocation no longer seemed like an option under Bud’s System for serial small-market losers like the Royals. There were 32 teams and Major League Baseball claimed that nearly all franchises were losing money. There was only one obvious market that Bud held open as a negotiating tool. But Bud had a plan—a bad plan.

 

Contraction

        After the 2001 World Series, Bud and MLB began seriously exploring the issue of contraction. Contraction would eliminate Major League Franchises. The targets were the Minnesota Twins and the Montréal Expos. The Expos had been drawing some of the paltriest crowds in Major League history. Expos fans had been turned off by the 1994 Strike which ended Montréal’s season. At the time the Montréal was the winningest team in baseball. The Expos’ talent was drained shortly thereafter; the fans stayed away for good.

        The Twins were also struggling to compete in another “small market”, but the fans had not abandoned ship like in Montréal. Minnesota won multiple World Series and the Twin Cities still loved their Twins. The news that the Twins were one of the teams on the chopping block had Minnesotans up in arms.

        As the contraction idea progressed, the Union also had misgivings. The number of lost jobs was a big concern. MLB proceeded bumbling down the contraction path nonetheless. That is until they ran into legal troubles in Montréal. A court case was proceeding against MLB and New York Art Dealer Jeffrey Loria maintaining a conspiracy to deprive the other owners of the Expos of income. Eventually there seemed to be too many roadblocks on the way to contraction, and the idea was tabled indefinitely.

 

Relocation

        The Washington DC area had been pursuing Major League franchises since the early 1970s when the Washington Senators left for Texas to become the Rangers. There were near misses with the Padres, Astros, Athletics and Orioles among others. But the primary team that was talked about to occupy the Washington, DC area since the early 90s was the Expos. Even before the strike Montréal was a small market in a country with a weakening exchange rate. Olympic stadium was old and ill suited for baseball. The strike seemed to seal the deal by alienating the Expos fan base.

        But relocation had fallen out of favor in Baseball. This was not always the case. The Yankees had stayed put over the years, but across town the Dodgers and Giants headed west. The Red Sox were fixtures in Boston while the Braves moved twice taking Henry Aaron from Milwaukee to Atlanta.  The Washington Senators left DC for the second time after a 9-0 forfeit loss. That was 1971. Baseball subsequently expanded into Canada, Florida, to the Mountain West and Southwest. Baseball’s policy of not relocating may sound like an altruistic protection of the existing teams’ fans. It is anything but.

        Holding open at least one viable market was MLB’s leverage to get new stadiums from municipalities. A franchise would flirt with an unoccupied city, fans would cause a stir and frightened officials would build a new stadium. This strategy had worked so many times it should have lost its punch eventually but never did—until Montréal and Miami.

Two Franchises in Trouble

        As the 90’s wore on it became obvious that something had to be done with the Expos. Its time as a viable baseball franchise had expired. Baseball was bleeding revenue sharing dollars and TV rights money into the gaping chasm that was Olympic Stadium. As if that wasn’t troubling enough, an expansion team not 10 years old was withering in a gigantic market in South Florida. The Florida Marlins were unable to leave their football stadium surroundings for a baseball-only park and it was crushing attendance. Then things really got ugly.

        After the Marlins ’97 Wild-Card World Series Win, Wayne Huizenga, Blockbuster billionaire and then-owner of the Marlins falsely claimed to be losing more money than he was. The Marlins then began the most embarrassing fire sale in baseball history. All of the important pieces of the Marlins were traded away. Fans stayed away in droves. The Marlins were to win the World Series again in 2003 only to have another fire sale at the end of 2005.

        Neither municipality responded to the threat of relocation. Repeated efforts to get the lucrative “downtown stadium” failed in Canada and Florida. Baseball didn’t want to move either franchise because it had only one viable market left: Washington, DC. All other markets didn’t have the population, business cash or both to be a credible threat to pesky governments that wouldn’t pony up the half-billion for a new stadium. In 2002, baseball stepped into the fray allowing then-Marlins Owner John Henry to purchase the Red Sox and shipping the Expos’ carpetbagger owner Jeffrey Loria to the Marlins. Baseball purchased the Expos and proceeded to lose millions.

        Owners around the league began to push for relocation as a way to recoup the money spent on the Expos. Bud knew that his trump card was ineffective with at least two teams, so he agreed to a sweetheart stadium deal with DC Mayor Anthony Williams. The Expos were on their way to DC from a town that had written off MLB a decade before. Major League baseball’s decision to delay relocation to Washington, DC cost owners tens of millions. Selig hoped to recoup those losses with a hefty expansion fee. Unfortunately, Washington baseball fans’ relationship with Major League Baseball had seriously eroded over the years. It would only get worse.

 

High Hopes

        The Nationals’ inaugural season was a smashing success. Fathers could take their kids to games on the Metro and Lobbyists had a place to take their Congressmen. The Nationals drew 2.7 million fans. Still Bud and his Igor, Jerry Reinsdorf, (owner of the White Sox) immediately began to poison the situation. Despite the huge profit pocketed by Major League Baseball, the Nationals’ budget was not significantly increased. Key players departed for what would have seemed a pittance to other franchises. Selig delayed naming an owner for a calendar year. Baseball indemnified the neighboring Orioles not with a cash payout, but instead stripped the Nats of their TV rights. The ensuing conflict has kept the Nationals off the area’s largest cable provider for two seasons. And then there was the clash with the DC City Council.

        The DC City Council was not included in initial stadium discussions but needed to approve the stadium lease nonetheless. MLB wanted no cap on stadium spending by the City; the council wanted a cap. Reinsdorf called the 2.7 million fans at aging RFK a “disappointment”, in an attempt to weaken the city’s bargaining position. Then Selig and Reinsdorf trotted out the old “we’re going to move the team” routine, but that dog no longer hunts and the DC Council held the line. Baseball caved and changed a “done deal” with DC not once, but twice. Bud’s long-time “carrot”, Washington, killed his stadium scam once and for all.

        The Nationals second season has not looked good so far. Sub-20,000 crowds are common. RFK’s home run killing, bad sightlines and poor food service kept some away. Baseball’s doubling of ticket prices for many games deterred many others. Worst of all, the unending greed in the face of a $1 billion payday has turned more than a few stomachs in Washington, DC. What once was a huge market desperate for baseball deteriorated in less than two years under Selig’s watchful stewardship.

What’s Next for Troubled Franchises?

        Seeing how Baseball is staggering in a top-10 market, the relocation options for troubled franchises look bleak. San Antonio is looking to pony up the dough to get Baseball and Football, but with the 37^th largest media market it is a problematic choice. (The NFL will not even entertain the possibility.) The idea of moving a team from the 17^th largest market to the 37^th would not bode well for television deals. Also, seeing how small markets are unable to afford top players, the forecast for a winning San Antonio Armadillos team looks gloomy. The Sacramento area at 19 and Portland at 23 are the largest markets in play, easily in Baseball’s “small market” category. Charlotte (Ranked 27^th) and Las Vegas (48^th) round out the small market candidates.

        The other option for smaller market franchises is revenue sharing and a salary cap. Until there is a commissioner who can forge consensus among the owners on revenue sharing and alternately stand up to and compromise with the Union, lower budgeted franchises will suffer. The Collective Bargaining Agreement expires December 17^th, 2006. It would be nice if Bud conveniently “retired.” MLB can hire Paul Tagliabue for the negotiations.

    We’ve all been there—puzzling as to why our team has lost a key piece, or was unable to acquire the prize free agent from the small-market team. It seemed as if your general manager was a major player in the negotiations then for some reason your favorite player was gone. The GM always “did everything they could” and the team really wanted said free agent. Then the player says the team had no offer that was close and had no interest in matching. (Then the player says the new contract wasn’t about money…but that’s another post.) What gives?
    Oftentimes your team’s owner and GM have no intention of signing the player they are supposedly bidding for. Whether it’s a money issue, cap room or a desire to go with somebody else (usually less well-known, but sometimes equally productive) the team just isn’t interested. Due to the pressure from fans to see the team actively attempting to acquire free agents (in the hopes of winning, of course) or to drive up the price of a player for your rival teams, the team will pretend to be a player in the bidding for a free agent. Here’s several types of fake bidding that occur:


“We Really Tried"

    This is usually done by teams to alleviate pressure to acquire a popular free agent or keep a local hero. It requires another team to play the bully, so your GM can paint your team as a helpless victim.     A recent case was Antwaan Randle El. The Steelers quickly resigned themselves to losing Randle El. No game was necessary; their fans were satisfied that the Super Bowl Champs were going to operate successfully within a limited budget. But a lot of noise was being made by Chicagoans (Michael Wilbon for example) that the Bears ought to bolster their receiving corps by bringing a hometown boy back to the Windy City.


    The Bears’ actions were strictly David Blaine. An $18 million offer was floated on the breeze as Randle El made his way to Redskins Park. Randle El turned it down flat before even meeting with Cerato, Snyder and Gibbs. Everybody involved knew that the Skins were going to come to the table with significantly more, especially the Bears. They slid in a nice low-ball hoping the Redskins would knock it out of the park, and they did.
    The Bears knew well that the Redskins reputation for “overpaying” would cover their #### on the low-ball. Plus, they would get the benefit of saying “We tried to get Randle El.” Furthermore, the Bears “never had a chance” because of the “overpaying” of the Redskins. What would have happened had the Bears made a serious offer in the neighborhood of what Randle El finally received? Maybe he’d still be in Washington, but maybe he’d be in Chicago. The Bears never wanted him. Instead they got exactly what they wanted without spending a dime.


    Johnny Damon was a similar “We tried” only in slow motion. The market for Damon was softer than expected. Damon was looking for 5 or 6 years, and had no takers. The Sox had floated a low-ball 3-year offer and almost got what they didn’t want: Johnny Damon in the outfield. There were a bunch of teams with similarly bogus offers on the table like the Orioles (who are always “almost” getting free agents) but nobody to take the fall for the Sox when their World Series hero left town.
    Then the Evil Yankees Empire stepped in. The Yankees saved the day, offering the 4th year, “overpaying” an older player and playing the big, rich, bully for the Red Sox to blame--even though the Sox have the 2nd highest payroll in baseball. The Red Sox float the “We tried” balloon and Coco Crisp is playing at Fenway a little too quickly to have not been the plan all along.


    Why do these teams “overpay” these guys anyway? Randle El can be worth at least $31 million to the Redskins, while maybe not being worth as much to the Bears in their situation. Washington already makes tons of money, but now the Randle El jerseys are flying off the shelves and Snyder can jack up ticket prices, which is just what happened.
    Steinbrenner is making money 18 different ways off of the Yankees. Not only Damon jerseys and fannies in the seats, but television deals that would make the Devil Rays drool. The Yankee product gets a big boost in the middle of the off-season, and Big Stein gets richer. Being the villain isn’t a problem when you’re making money hand-over-fist (and Darth Vader is the coolest character in Star Wars  anyway.)


“Bid Them Up”

    Ebay is a dangerous thing. You’ve bid on something and someone with a evil-sounding screen name outbids you. You bid against each other a few times and now you’ve reached your limit. Then the devil on your shoulder whispers, “bid him up.” So you put in a few extra bids just to cost him a little Cabbage Patch Kid collection.
    Teams do this with free agents all the time. Every extra dollar tied up may cost your rival a player down the line. This is very popular in the American League East.
    Toronto had entered very credible negotiations with Marlins hurler AJ Burnett. As they neared the end of reeling in Burnett, there were still teams hanging on somewhere near the Toronto number. Baltimore and Boston stayed in the mix to drive the price up another $5 million at least. Toronto got their man, and Baltimore and Boston got to squeeze their division rival for the price of a quality utility man or middle reliever.

“The Phantom Offer”


    If you really want to play it safe, this is the way to go. Atlanta mastered this maneuver years ago. The Hawks always have acres of cap space and no intention of using it. Two years ago when Kenyon Martin was a free agent, the New York Times reported that the Hawks were expected to tender Martin a max deal offer. This would have been a bold addition for the hapless Hawks had it been a real offer.
    But it never materialized. This “Phantom Offer” had a little bit of the “we tried” (if you weren’t paying too close attention) and ultimately “bid up” the price to a max deal for Denver.  The beneficial effect of this non-bid is a bit less than tendering an actual offer. The financial risk, of course, is zero, so any benefits are free. We’ll see whether there’s a bid or a no-bid on Harrington this summer. I’m guessing non-bid.

    Owners and GM’s play a lot of games because, like it or not, sports is a big business. The same brinksmanship and deceit occurs in high-stakes business deals around the world. I think it is important to realize that just like when David Blaine supposedly holds his breath for nine minutes, nothing is what it appears to be.