In 1989, a movie that embodied the mysterious power of baseball’s past was released. Field of Dreams featured an Iowa farmer constructing a shrine to baseball in his cornfield. “Build it and they will come,” boomed the disembodied voice that commanded Ray Kinsella (Kevin Costner) to risk everything and build a baseball field. They came, fallen heroes of yesteryear and ancient wanna-be’s looking for an at-bat in the Iowa countryside.
Meanwhile in Baltimore, another field of dreams was breaking ground. It was to be top ballpark designer HOK’s masterpiece—a new “retro” ballpark. Camden Yards, as it came to be known by fans, was to have features like irregular outfield dimensions that had long ago been designed out of the multi-sport ballparks of the 60s and 70s. Right field abutted an old warehouse that lent an aged feel to the entire project. It was a risky move back then, right after the futuristic Sky Dome was opened (another HOK project) but the risk paid off beautifully.
Oriole Park at Camden Yards opened in 1992. Fans marveled that the stadium still had an old-time feel even as they took the escalator to the upper deck. Camden Yards had all of the modern club seats and suites to maximize profit; yet the fan could still mainline baseball Americana. A stadium somehow was revitalizing the game—filling in for Ebbets Field, the Polo Grounds, Griffith Stadium and countless others that had been senselessly destroyed to make room for cookie-cutter stadiums that looked like spaceships. 1992 seemed like a new beginning for baseball. Unfortunately, 1992 was also the year Bud Selig took over as acting commissioner and sent Major League Baseball into a spiral that no beautiful stadium could save.
The Strike and “Saving Baseball”
Bud Selig has hardly set up his office when the worst athletic strike in major sports history landed at his feet in 1994. Selig’s bumbling brinksmanship led to the cancellation of the World Series for the first time in 90 years. (Neither World War II nor a major earthquake cancelled the hallowed event.) The cancellation engendered a wave of bad feelings across the continent. Montreal fans had given up on baseball entirely. Other franchises saw a steep drop in attendance. In the absence of the October classic, the NFL solidified its stranglehold as the number one sport in America. Baseball was now a distant number two. Selig desperately hunted for a messiah to save the game.
There were two events that were touted as “Saving Baseball”. The first was Cal Ripken’s consecutive games played streak. Ripken was scheduled to break Lou “Iron Horse” Gehrig’s consecutive games streak of 2,130 in September of 1995. Fresh off of the strike, fans, players and owners alike rooted for Ripken not to get an infected hangnail and therefore not be able to “save baseball.” Ripken didn’t disappoint. On September 9th, 1995, the giant numbers on the Camden Yards Warehouse turned from 2,130 to 2,131 and America celebrated.
This achievement was impressive, but it didn’t quite “save baseball.” Cal’s record harkened back to the almost quaint work-a-day ethos of yesteryear. Baseball already has the nostalgia market cornered, strike or not. The Iron Man record had none of the pop of a quarterback sack or a slam dunk. So in a few short years, baseball would need to be “saved” again.
Home Run Derby
In the summer of 1998 Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa were chasing a 37-year old record. The single-season home run record was one of the most storied in baseball. Roger Maris’ 61 had stood since 1961. Before Maris baseball’s most enduring legend, George Herman “Babe” Ruth held the record with 60 homers hit in 1927. Notoriously cranky and su####iously huge St. Louis Cardinal Mark McGwire would steal the record away. Similarly large Sammy Sosa smiled his way to also eclipsing the record, only to be second behind McGwire.
Mark McGwire’s remarkable transformation from a lanky young slugger with the Oakland Athletics to a gigantically muscled pro-wrestler with St. Louis did not go unnoticed. McGwire was known to have used Androstenedione (commonly known as “Andro”) a naturally occurring steroid. Andro would later be federally criminalized in 2004. Other steroid use was rumored but unconfirmed.
When McGwire shattered the single-season home run record by hitting 70 home runs, Bud Selig basked in the celebration. Never mind that McGwire was ingesting a dangerous “suppliment” and was a terrible example for kids. South Park’s “say no to drugs” parody featuring a dangerously large McGwire and Jason Giambi was only one outlet to successfully skewer baseball’s permissive attitude towards performance enhancers. But baseball had been so damaged by Bud’s leadership that the sport desperately needed a shot in the arm, and the players gladly volunteered for the needle.
Just three years later, Barry Bonds broke McGwire’s recordonce again Selig reacted with a wink and a nod. Major League Baseball still had not instituted steroid testing, so there was no chance that bloated Bonds would be busted. Barry’s 73 home runs seemed superhuman, and as some knew even at the time, it was superhuman. MLB was raking in huge profits from ticket sales, and Bud was in no rush to outlaw steroids. The deleterious effect that baseball’s steroid policy was having on the sporting landscape was not considered. Bonds, McGwire, Giambi and others were walking billboards for steroid use. Sure enough, high schoolers and younger athletes were sold on the product.
The increasing su####ion from gigantic upper bodies and bigger home run totals boiled over. Fans and media began pressuring MLB to curtail steroid use in a meaningful way. Baseball finally instituted a steroid testing policy in 2003. It was the most laughable drug testing regime of all time. Tests were anonymous and positive testers were not to be penalized. Not until 2005 was Baseball forced to get serious because of a damaging book and the US Congress.
In early 2005, former Oakland A’s slugger Jose Canseco released Juiced: Wild Times, Rampant 'Roids, Smash Hits & How Baseball Got Big. His book implicated Barry Bonds, Jason Giambi, Mark McGwire, Rafael Palmeiro, Roger Clemens and many other players in what was coming to be known as the “Steroid Era.” Congress was more than ready to take an active role in Baseball—after all, congresspersons had the brand new Washington Nationals to worry about.
For the steroid hearings, Congress invited many ex-players implicated by the Canseco book to testify. Baltimore Orioles star Rafael Palmeiro protested his innocence. Mark McGwire didn’t want to talk and wasn’t forced to. Congressional heavyweights like John McCain began to throw their weight around to get a more stringent steroid policy. Baseball was repeatedly threatened by federal legislation, and both the owners and union caved. The new steroid testing had teeth and Selig began pointing fingers everywhere but at himself.
The new performance enhancer testing policy netted a very big fish almost immediately. Likely Hall of Famer Rafael Palmeiro, fresh off his proclamations of innocence in front of Congress, tested positive for steroids on August 1st. Palmeiro subsequently ended his Major League career by throwing his teammate, All-Star Orioles Shortstop Miguel Tejada, under the steroid bus. Palmeiro claimed Tejada had been injected him with steroids in the guise of a B-12 shot.
Sadly, players sharing needles full of who-knows-what seemed believable in the clubhouse environment painted by Juiced. But Palmeiro’s accusation sounded like a desperate attempt by a doping player to restore his mortally damaged reputation. What started as a 10-day league-mandated suspension turned into a de facto lifetime ban. Rafael Palmeiro used to be a hero in Baltimore, now he doesn’t dare show his face in the state of Maryland. Baseball’s formerly permissive attitude towards performance enhancers had only started to embarrass the game.
Bonds and BALCO
In Northern California, a steroid dealer posing as a sports nutritionist named Victor Conte was in trouble. His “nutrition center,” the Bay Area Laboratory Co-operative (BALCO), was under investigation for designing and distributing steroids. Conte and the other BALCO figures would cut a deal for a short amount of jail time.
The BALCO prosecution had a few other deleterious side-effects. Many high-profile Bay Area Major Leaguers were implicated as clients of the steroid lab. Barry Bonds, Jason Giambi and Gary Sheffield highlighted the list of Major Leaguers involved with Conte and BALCO. This was yet another black eye for a sport that had been delivered so many over the Selig regime. Bud Selig’s salutary neglect steroid policy would continue to damage the credibility of Baseball. And Selig’s disasterous leadership could not lead baseball out of the woods.
Barry Bonds was looming like a ghost in MLB’s attic. He was injured for much of 2005, but ended the season on a home run tear. He still looked just as artificially big as before. Hank Aaron’s all time home run record was reachable in 2006, but shortly after spring training began, baseball was given another laceration.
Game of Shadows, a book written by San Francisco Chronicle reporters detailed Bonds’ extensive steroid use. The accusations were nothing new, but the extensive details of Bonds’ drug abuse were shocking even to those hardened by the disappointing revelations of the “Steroid Era.” The authors’ affiliation with one of America’s most respected newspapers made the accusations even more believable. Game of Shadows toppled another domino leading to embarrassment and revealing hypocrisy by Bonds and baseball. The 2006 season was off to a rollicking start..
The Accidental Witch Hunt
Bonds’ reaction was disturbing to many. He opened Giants training camp by playing the role of Paula Abdul in a San Francisco Giants parody of American Idol. Dressing in drag was not the scariest part (though he’s not exactly RuPaul.) Instead, his “strapless top” constructed of T-Shirts revealed a chest that was many times bigger than Paula’s. Bonds’ pumped-up physique fueled the steroid controversy while he clumsily attempted to distract America from the same issue.
Subsequently, two bumbling organizations declared their intentions to investigate Bonds. The US Congress declared their desire to look into possible counts of Perjury in Bonds’ grand jury testimony relating to BALCO. Perjury counts are notoriously hard to prove and this gesture read as blatant political pandering. The American public was already tiring of Congress’ involvement in baseball considering the various foreign and domestic crises that remained un-addressed by an increasingly unpopular Republican Congress and President.
Selig also unadvisedly declared that Baseball would be “investigating” Bonds. Unlike Congress, Baseball does not have ready access to professional, skilled investigators. Clearly Bud knew the “investigation” had no teeth, and was floated only to deflect blame from himself. Unfortunately for Selig, this token gesture designed to take some of the heat off of MLB’s big wigs had the opposite effect.
Major League Baseball’s desire to investigate only one man was viewed as hypocritical at best. Bud Selig’s “too little too late” gesture was contrasted with his permissive approach to Mark McGwire and others in the late 90s and angered many.
Bonds started the season chasing Babe Ruth’s 714 home runs to become the leading left-handed home run hitter in baseball history. As Bonds approached Ruth, (he is one home run shy) it seemed to many that Baseball’s investigation of Bonds was an attack on an African American player who was eclipsing a white icon. Many fans harboring racist intentions used this atmosphere as a platform to skewer Bonds for Black and White reasons. Other fans defended Bonds and spewed venom at racist fans and a perceived racist climate at the top of Major League Baseball. Bud Selig did not have a history of racism in his past, just gross incompetence.
Racism or Incompetence?
I don’t believe investigating Bonds was a racist move on the part of Selig and the MLB offices. Rather, it fits in nicely with Bud’s history of clumsy mismanagement of the game. Bonds’ steroid use (and that of many other players) has called into question the integrity of the game. If Bonds were to break Hank Aaron’s record, it would be perceived as a statement to fans, players and owners that cheaters win. Except for most of Bonds’ career when he was piling up home runs, steroids weren’t even banned. So Bonds didn’t cheat to get those home runs; he played solidly within the lose ground rules of Major League Baseball.
If Bud and baseball were racist, they wouldn’t have cheered as Bonds broke the single-season home run record in 2001 then held by fellow juicer McGwire. Baseball celebrated Bonds and cashed in mightily in the process. Bud never had a problem with race but then again, he never had a problem with steroids either.
So in a Palmeiro-style move, Selig prepared to sacrifice Bonds on the altar of American public opinion to save his cringing, sniveling steroid-soaked hide. Like most Selig gestures, it backfired big-time. Bonds will be nearly untouchable by MLB as he approaches Hank Aaron’s record having been inoculated by Selig perceived racism. Furthermore, Selig will have to show support at such an event and graphically link himself with his doping legacy. A Bonds and Selig photo the night Barry clobbers his 756th career home run would be fitting irony. It would also cripple baseball’s legacy as the only sport where people care about statistics and the past.
At Camden Yards
I went up to Camden Yards Saturday with a good buddy. Walking up to the ballpark, I was reminded of how amazing it looks. I had been exclusively attending Nationals games since they moved to DC, since it was a short drive or metro ride to RFK Stadium. RFK is okay to see games, but it looks beat up and weathered, inside and out. Camden Yards perfectly blends with its turn of the century neighbor the B&O Warehouse. The effect is transporting and you can’t help but drink in the Americana.
We got $8 seats after the 4:35 game had already started, sat in the last row of the upper deck, and still saw every pitch beautifully. The opponent was everybody’s homecoming team, the super-small market Kansas City Royals. Their blue caps looked as snappy as in the George Brett days; still, I felt a win in the cards.
Oriole Park has great food service, from the traditional hot dogs, to barbecue and crab cakes. I got an Italian Sausage, which I have been addicted to from visiting my grandmother in Queens. My friend raved about the Barbecue.
When we returned I suggested we move down a bit, to the front row of the upper deck. We shot the #### for a while in a section that had largely emptied out for the last innings of the game. The 8th inning snapped us out of our conversation as the Orioles broke through for 3 homers and 6 runs. The final score was a big blowout: 11-1 Birds. It was great fun.
Only some small nagging thoughts threatened to spoil the afternoon. I couldn’t help wondering as each home run sailed over the fence whether Tejada had passed the “B-12” all spring. Sammy Sosa breathed his last in this ballpark, breaking down su####iously quickly for a top shelf player. Palmeiro’s words have stained the Orange and Black and the Orioles are better known now for steroid scandal than for Ripken’s heroics.
Additionally, beating the Royals was less enjoyable than winning against a viable franchise. I didn’t know where they were in the standings (shockingly I hadn’t paid attention to the hapless Royals) but still knew they were at the bottom. They are a team that is mired in losing and probably will be for a very long time. It’s hard to imagine that there are any Royals fans left as every good player heads to bigger markets. A victory over the Royals is no victory at all.
Baseball is still a popular sport, solidly second behind the NFL in popularity. But how much longer can Baseball sustain its popularity with Bug Selig’s criminally negligent leadership? Pujols’s triple crown threatening season can’t lift baseball up when whispers of steroids and “masking agents” dog every muscular player. A new yet-to-be-built stadium in Washington, DC is tainted by baseball’s dirty negotiation strategies. More and more “small market” franchises feel like they can’t compete and have no hope of doing so. Those franchises have no place left to move.
When will Bud Selig be held accountable for his pathetic mismanagement? When will Major League Baseball rise up and dethrone a modern-day Nero: vain, greedy, power mad and incompetent? America is waiting.
Part One: Expansion, Contraction, Relocation and Depression
When Kirby Puckett died earlier this year, it reminded me of everything that baseball used to be just a decade or two ago. Puckett was the undersized, overweight hero of two Twins’ World Series wins. When Puckett stole a home run from over the fence, America cheered for the little guy. The Twins’ home Minneapolis-St. Paul was an undersized, too-cold metropolitan area that twice claimed the championship of the world in the late eighties and early nineties.
Just as Frank DeFord lacerated Puckett’s image in Sports Illustrated in the years since, Bud Selig has sliced and diced Baseball and it’s competitive tradition like Zorro. Selig’s legacy will be one of mismanagement and incompetence. I suggest that legacy should start immediately.
The Strike
Selig was installed as acting commissioner in 1992. It didn’t take long until he helped inflict a gaping wound to Major League Baseball. The strike of 1994 cancelled the last half of the season and the World Series.
Canceling a World Series is always horrible. But canceling one for no reason is worse. MLB was unable to institute a salary cap or meaningful revenue sharing in its showdown with the players. Instead, when play resumed in 1995, the collective bargaining agreement was largely the same. Baseball could have reached the same agreement without a day of striking or lost revenue.
Football and Basketball both had struggled with labor strife but neither had missed a championship. Imagine if you had season tickets in 1994 and you paid for and sat through 100 games only to have no playoffs, no World Series and no champion. In the wake of the strike, Bud Selig would try to restore faith in America’s Pastime. Instead, Baseball’s credibility was just beginning to be damaged.
Haves and Have Nots
After the ’94 strike, Major League Baseball was in a no better position to address issues of competitive inequity than before the strike. The big-budget Yankees would begin a reign of dominance, leading to a run of four championships in five years to close the decade. Meanwhile, talent was bleeding from “small-market” teams like the Kansas City Royals. This kind of imbalance is nothing new to baseball. The Kansas City Athletics shipped Roger Maris to the Yanks prior to his two MVPs and 1961’s 61 home runs and World Series championship.
In the old days, if there were problems staying competitive in your city you could always move. There wasn’t the 33-year gap in franchise relocation that Selig oversaw the last half of. Also there were only 18 Major League franchises. So the Kansas City A’s took off for Oakland in ’68 and four years later Reggie Jackson and co. won 3 straight World Series. Kansas City was awarded the expansion Royals in 1969.
As Bud’s era crept forward, players and teams realized that parity, a sporting concept Pete Rozelle and the NFL made famous, was going to be impossible to achieve with no salary cap and limited revenue sharing. The Union and the courts had long ago caught on to Baseball’s previous “salary cap”: collusion. Since then it has been every team for itself. It only took one gigantic contract for most franchises to hit the panic button: ARod’s.
Alex Rodriguez’s 2000 contract with the Texas Rangers blew all other sports contracts out of the water. His $252 million 10-year deal was a record at the time. In comparison, the Royals franchise sold that same year for $96 million. Despite MVP-caliber production, Rodriguez’s contract turned into an anchor for even the large-market Rangers. ARod, as you know, headed for the super-rich Yankees.
Johnny Damon and Carlos Beltrán are just two of the Royals’ ex-players who also eventually made their way to New York. Relocation no longer seemed like an option under Bud’s System for serial small-market losers like the Royals. There were 32 teams and Major League Baseball claimed that nearly all franchises were losing money. There was only one obvious market that Bud held open as a negotiating tool. But Bud had a plan—a bad plan.
Contraction
After the 2001 World Series, Bud and MLB began seriously exploring the issue of contraction. Contraction would eliminate Major League Franchises. The targets were the Minnesota Twins and the Montréal Expos. The Expos had been drawing some of the paltriest crowds in Major League history. Expos fans had been turned off by the 1994 Strike which ended Montréal’s season. At the time the Montréal was the winningest team in baseball. The Expos’ talent was drained shortly thereafter; the fans stayed away for good.
The Twins were also struggling to compete in another “small market”, but the fans had not abandoned ship like in Montréal. Minnesota won multiple World Series and the Twin Cities still loved their Twins. The news that the Twins were one of the teams on the chopping block had Minnesotans up in arms.
As the contraction idea progressed, the Union also had misgivings. The number of lost jobs was a big concern. MLB proceeded bumbling down the contraction path nonetheless. That is until they ran into legal troubles in Montréal. A court case was proceeding against MLB and New York Art Dealer Jeffrey Loria maintaining a conspiracy to deprive the other owners of the Expos of income. Eventually there seemed to be too many roadblocks on the way to contraction, and the idea was tabled indefinitely.
Relocation
The Washington DC area had been pursuing Major League franchises since the early 1970s when the Washington Senators left for Texas to become the Rangers. There were near misses with the Padres, Astros, Athletics and Orioles among others. But the primary team that was talked about to occupy the Washington, DC area since the early 90s was the Expos. Even before the strike Montréal was a small market in a country with a weakening exchange rate. Olympic stadium was old and ill suited for baseball. The strike seemed to seal the deal by alienating the Expos fan base.
But relocation had fallen out of favor in Baseball. This was not always the case. The Yankees had stayed put over the years, but across town the Dodgers and Giants headed west. The Red Sox were fixtures in Boston while the Braves moved twice taking Henry Aaron from Milwaukee to Atlanta.The Washington Senators left DC for the second time after a 9-0 forfeit loss. That was 1971. Baseball subsequently expanded into Canada, Florida, to the Mountain West and Southwest. Baseball’s policy of not relocating may sound like an altruistic protection of the existing teams’ fans. It is anything but.
Holding open at least one viable market was MLB’s leverage to get new stadiums from municipalities. A franchise would flirt with an unoccupied city, fans would cause a stir and frightened officials would build a new stadium. This strategy had worked so many times it should have lost its punch eventually but never did—until Montréal and Miami.
Two Franchises in Trouble
As the 90’s wore on it became obvious that something had to be done with the Expos. Its time as a viable baseball franchise had expired. Baseball was bleeding revenue sharing dollars and TV rights money into the gaping chasm that was Olympic Stadium. As if that wasn’t troubling enough, an expansion team not 10 years old was withering in a gigantic market in South Florida. The Florida Marlins were unable to leave their football stadium surroundings for a baseball-only park and it was crushing attendance. Then things really got ugly.
After the Marlins ’97 Wild-Card World Series Win, Wayne Huizenga, Blockbuster billionaire and then-owner of the Marlins falsely claimed to be losing more money than he was. The Marlins then began the most embarrassing fire sale in baseball history. All of the important pieces of the Marlins were traded away. Fans stayed away in droves. The Marlins were to win the World Series again in 2003 only to have another fire sale at the end of 2005.
Neither municipality responded to the threat of relocation. Repeated efforts to get the lucrative “downtown stadium” failed in Canada and Florida. Baseball didn’t want to move either franchise because it had only one viable market left: Washington, DC. All other markets didn’t have the population, business cash or both to be a credible threat to pesky governments that wouldn’t pony up the half-billion for a new stadium. In 2002, baseball stepped into the fray allowing then-Marlins Owner John Henry to purchase the Red Sox and shipping the Expos’ carpetbagger owner Jeffrey Loria to the Marlins. Baseball purchased the Expos and proceeded to lose millions.
Owners around the league began to push for relocation as a way to recoup the money spent on the Expos. Bud knew that his trump card was ineffective with at least two teams, so he agreed to a sweetheart stadium deal with DC Mayor Anthony Williams. The Expos were on their way to DC from a town that had written off MLB a decade before. Major League baseball’s decision to delay relocation to Washington, DC cost owners tens of millions. Selig hoped to recoup those losses with a hefty expansion fee. Unfortunately, Washington baseball fans’ relationship with Major League Baseball had seriously eroded over the years. It would only get worse.
High Hopes
The Nationals’ inaugural season was a smashing success. Fathers could take their kids to games on the Metro and Lobbyists had a place to take their Congressmen. The Nationals drew 2.7 million fans. Still Bud and his Igor, Jerry Reinsdorf, (owner of the White Sox) immediately began to poison the situation. Despite the huge profit pocketed by Major League Baseball, the Nationals’ budget was not significantly increased. Key players departed for what would have seemed a pittance to other franchises. Selig delayed naming an owner for a calendar year. Baseball indemnified the neighboring Orioles not with a cash payout, but instead stripped the Nats of their TV rights. The ensuing conflict has kept the Nationals off the area’s largest cable provider for two seasons. And then there was the clash with the DC City Council.
The DC City Council was not included in initial stadium discussions but needed to approve the stadium lease nonetheless. MLB wanted no cap on stadium spending by the City; the council wanted a cap. Reinsdorf called the 2.7 million fans at aging RFK a “disappointment”, in an attempt to weaken the city’s bargaining position. Then Selig and Reinsdorf trotted out the old “we’re going to move the team” routine, but that dog no longer hunts and the DC Council held the line. Baseball caved and changed a “done deal” with DC not once, but twice. Bud’s long-time “carrot”, Washington, killed his stadium scam once and for all.
The Nationals second season has not looked good so far. Sub-20,000 crowds are common. RFK’s home run killing, bad sightlines and poor food service kept some away. Baseball’s doubling of ticket prices for many games deterred many others. Worst of all, the unending greed in the face of a $1 billion payday has turned more than a few stomachs in Washington, DC. What once was a huge market desperate for baseball deteriorated in less than two years under Selig’s watchful stewardship.
What’s Next for Troubled Franchises?
Seeing how Baseball is staggering in a top-10 market, the relocation options for troubled franchises look bleak. San Antonio is looking to pony up the dough to get Baseball and Football, but with the 37th largest media market it is a problematic choice. (The NFL will not even entertain the possibility.) The idea of moving a team from the 17th largest market to the 37th would not bode well for television deals. Also, seeing how small markets are unable to afford top players, the forecast for a winning San Antonio Armadillos team looks gloomy. The Sacramento area at 19 and Portland at 23 are the largest markets in play, easily in Baseball’s “small market” category. Charlotte (Ranked 27th) and Las Vegas (48th) round out the small market candidates.
The other option for smaller market franchises is revenue sharing and a salary cap. Until there is a commissioner who can forge consensus among the owners on revenue sharing and alternately stand up to and compromise with the Union, lower budgeted franchises will suffer. The Collective Bargaining Agreement expires December 17th, 2006. It would be nice if Bud conveniently “retired.” MLB can hire Paul Tagliabue for the negotiations.
We’ve all been there—puzzling as to why our team has lost a key piece, or was unable to acquire the prize free agent from the small-market team. It seemed as if your general manager was a major player in the negotiations then for some reason your favorite player was gone. The GM always “did everything they could” and the team really wanted said free agent. Then the player says the team had no offer that was close and had no interest in matching. (Then the player says the new contract wasn’t about money…but that’s another post.) What gives? Oftentimes your team’s owner and GM have no intention of signing the player they are supposedly bidding for. Whether it’s a money issue, cap room or a desire to go with somebody else (usually less well-known, but sometimes equally productive) the team just isn’t interested. Due to the pressure from fans to see the team actively attempting to acquire free agents (in the hopes of winning, of course) or to drive up the price of a player for your rival teams, the team will pretend to be a player in the bidding for a free agent. Here’s several types of fake bidding that occur:
“We Really Tried"
This is usually done by teams to alleviate pressure to acquire a popular free agent or keep a local hero. It requires another team to play the bully, so your GM can paint your team as a helpless victim. A recent case was Antwaan Randle El. The Steelers quickly resigned themselves to losing Randle El. No game was necessary; their fans were satisfied that the Super Bowl Champs were going to operate successfully within a limited budget. But a lot of noise was being made by Chicagoans (Michael Wilbon for example) that the Bears ought to bolster their receiving corps by bringing a hometown boy back to the Windy City.
The Bears’ actions were strictly David Blaine. An $18 million offer was floated on the breeze as Randle El made his way to Redskins Park. Randle El turned it down flat before even meeting with Cerato, Snyder and Gibbs. Everybody involved knew that the Skins were going to come to the table with significantly more, especially the Bears. They slid in a nice low-ball hoping the Redskins would knock it out of the park, and they did. The Bears knew well that the Redskins reputation for “overpaying” would cover their #### on the low-ball. Plus, they would get the benefit of saying “We tried to get Randle El.” Furthermore, the Bears “never had a chance” because of the “overpaying” of the Redskins. What would have happened had the Bears made a serious offer in the neighborhood of what Randle El finally received? Maybe he’d still be in Washington, but maybe he’d be in Chicago. The Bears never wanted him. Instead they got exactly what they wanted without spending a dime.
Johnny Damon was a similar “We tried” only in slow motion. The market for Damon was softer than expected. Damon was looking for 5 or 6 years, and had no takers. The Sox had floated a low-ball 3-year offer and almost got what they didn’t want: Johnny Damon in the outfield. There were a bunch of teams with similarly bogus offers on the table like the Orioles (who are always “almost” getting free agents) but nobody to take the fall for the Sox when their World Series hero left town. Then the Evil Yankees Empire stepped in. The Yankees saved the day, offering the 4th year, “overpaying” an older player and playing the big, rich, bully for the Red Sox to blame--even though the Sox have the 2nd highest payroll in baseball. The Red Sox float the “We tried” balloon and Coco Crisp is playing at Fenway a little too quickly to have not been the plan all along.
Why do these teams “overpay” these guys anyway? Randle El can be worth at least $31 million to the Redskins, while maybe not being worth as much to the Bears in their situation. Washington already makes tons of money, but now the Randle El jerseys are flying off the shelves and Snyder can jack up ticket prices, which is just what happened. Steinbrenner is making money 18 different ways off of the Yankees. Not only Damon jerseys and fannies in the seats, but television deals that would make the Devil Rays drool. The Yankee product gets a big boost in the middle of the off-season, and Big Stein gets richer. Being the villain isn’t a problem when you’re making money hand-over-fist (and Darth Vader is the coolest character in Star Wars anyway.)
“Bid Them Up”
Ebay is a dangerous thing. You’ve bid on something and someone with a evil-sounding screen name outbids you. You bid against each other a few times and now you’ve reached your limit. Then the devil on your shoulder whispers, “bid him up.” So you put in a few extra bids just to cost him a little Cabbage Patch Kid collection. Teams do this with free agents all the time. Every extra dollar tied up may cost your rival a player down the line. This is very popular in the American League East. Toronto had entered very credible negotiations with Marlins hurler AJ Burnett. As they neared the end of reeling in Burnett, there were still teams hanging on somewhere near the Toronto number. Baltimore and Boston stayed in the mix to drive the price up another $5 million at least. Toronto got their man, and Baltimore and Boston got to squeeze their division rival for the price of a quality utility man or middle reliever.
“The Phantom Offer”
If you really want to play it safe, this is the way to go. Atlanta mastered this maneuver years ago. The Hawks always have acres of cap space and no intention of using it. Two years ago when Kenyon Martin was a free agent, the New York Times reported that the Hawks were expected to tender Martin a max deal offer. This would have been a bold addition for the hapless Hawks had it been a real offer. But it never materialized. This “Phantom Offer” had a little bit of the “we tried” (if you weren’t paying too close attention) and ultimately “bid up” the price to a max deal for Denver. The beneficial effect of this non-bid is a bit less than tendering an actual offer. The financial risk, of course, is zero, so any benefits are free. We’ll see whether there’s a bid or a no-bid on Harrington this summer. I’m guessing non-bid.
Owners and GM’s play a lot of games because, like it or not, sports is a big business. The same brinksmanship and deceit occurs in high-stakes business deals around the world. I think it is important to realize that just like when David Blaine supposedly holds his breath for nine minutes, nothing is what it appears to be.
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